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Regulating the Plea-Bargaining Market: 
From Caveat Emptor to Consumer 
Protection 
Stephanos Bibas* 
Padilla v. Kentucky was a watershed in the U.S. Supreme 
Court’s turn to regulating plea bargaining. For decades, the Court 
had focused on jury trials as the central subject of criminal 
procedure, with only modest and ineffective procedural regulation of 
guilty pleas. This older view treated trials as the norm, was 
indifferent to sentencing, trusted judges and juries to protect 
innocence, and drew clean lines excluding civil proceedings and 
collateral consequences from its purview. In United States v. Ruiz in 
2002, the Court began to focus on the realities of the plea process 
itself, but did so only halfway. Not until Padilla last year did the 
Court regulate plea bargaining’s substantive calculus, its attendant 
sentencing decisions, the lawyers who run it, and related collateral 
civil consequences. Padilla marks the eclipse of Justice Scalia’s 
formalist originalism, the parting triumph of Justice Stevens’s 
common-law incrementalism, and the rise of the two realistic ex-
prosecutors on the Court, Justices Alito and Sotomayor. To complete 
Padilla’s unfinished business, the Court and legislatures should look 
to consumer protection law to regulate at least the process if not the 
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INTRODUCTION 
The U.S. Supreme Court’s decision last year in Padilla v. Kentucky marks 
a watershed in the Court’s approach to regulating plea bargains. Padilla held 
that, before a guilty plea, criminal defense counsel must advise clients not only 
about the plea’s direct criminal consequences, but also about one of its chief 
collateral civil consequences, deportation.1 While Padilla’s holding is limited to 
deportation, its reasoning could reach much further. Padilla is a landmark 
interpretation of the Sixth Amendment’s right to effective assistance of counsel, 
but it is much more than that. The Court began to move beyond its fixation upon 
the handful of cases that go to jury trials. It recognized that the other 95 percent 
of adjudicated cases resolved by guilty pleas matter greatly, and began in earnest 
 
1. 130 S. Ct. 1473, 1486 (2010). 
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to regulate plea bargains the way it has long regulated jury trials.2 Though the 
Court’s shift in emphasis is nascent, it is long overdue and welcome. 
To understand Padilla’s grand implications, one must first appreciate the 
Court’s historical focus on jury trials. In recent decades, the Supreme Court has 
promulgated exacting procedures to regulate jury trials. For example, 
prosecutors must now produce live witnesses in court (instead of routine lab 
reports) and prove aggravating facts to juries beyond a reasonable doubt.3 But 
even as trial procedures hypertrophied, plea bargaining remained all but 
unregulated, a free market that sometimes resembled a Turkish bazaar.  
The Court’s indifference to pleas reflected both practicality and principle. 
The judicial system had grown addicted to plea bargaining, relying on guilty 
pleas to resolve the vast majority of criminal cases, and could not afford to 
stifle this trade.4 Courts, assuming that innocent defendants would not plead 
guilty and that parties plea bargain in the shadows of expected trial outcomes, 
counted on jury trials as backstops to protect defendants. Additionally, the Bill 
of Rights provided no explicit protections for plea bargaining. 
Much criminal procedure thus resembled a Potemkin village, a fine-
looking facade inhabited by few. The Court trusted the shadows cast by trials to 
regulate plea outcomes, even though few defendants dared risk the huge 
penalties for going to trial. And because most guilty pleas waive defendants’ 
rights to appeal, few typical guilty-plea cases ever reached the Supreme Court. 
The Court continued to filigree procedures for atypical jury trials, heedless of 
their effects on the overwhelming majority of cases resolved by plea. 
The last decade has seen its continuing share of anachronistic formalism 
focused on jury trials.5 But the Court has slowly begun to scrutinize bargaining 
in the real world of guilty pleas, beginning with United States v. Ruiz in 2002.6 
 
2. In 2004, of 582,480 felony convictions in state courts, 95 percent resulted from guilty 
pleas. Bureau of Justice Statistics, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Sourcebook of Criminal Justice Statistics 
Online, tbl.5.46.2004, http://www.albany.edu/sourcebook/pdf/t5462004.pdf. In fiscal year 2009, 
of 86,798 criminal cases disposed of in federal district court by trial or plea (thus excluding 
dismissals), 96.4 percent were disposed of by pleas of guilty or nolo contendere. Id. at 
tbl.5.24.2009, http://www.albany.edu/sourcebook/pdf/t5242009.pdf. Though it is impossible to be 
sure, most of these pleas probably resulted from plea bargains. 
3. See infra notes 60–61 and accompanying text; Melendez-Diaz v. Massachusetts, 129 S. 
Ct. 2527, 2542 (2009). 
4. As Chief Justice Burger remarked in a 1970 speech to the American Bar Association, 
even a small reduction in guilty-plea rates would have immense consequences. “A reduction from 
90 per cent to 80 per cent in guilty pleas requires the assignment of twice the judicial manpower 
and facilities—judges, court reporters, bailiffs, clerks, jurors and courtrooms. A reduction to 70 
per cent trebles this demand.” Warren Burger, The State of the Judiciary—1970, 56 A.B.A. J. 929, 
931 (1970). See also Blackledge v. Allison, 431 U.S. 63, 71 (1977) (“Whatever might be the 
situation in an ideal world, the fact is that the guilty plea and the often concomitant plea bargain 
are important components of this country’s criminal justice system.”). See generally GEORGE 
FISHER, PLEA BARGAINING’S TRIUMPH: A HISTORY OF PLEA BARGAINING IN AMERICA (2003) 
(arguing that plea bargaining has grown inexorably to handle crushing caseloads). 
5. See, e.g., infra notes 57–58 and accompanying text. 
6. 536 U.S. 622 (2002). 
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Ruiz held that prosecutors need not disclose impeachment or affirmative-
defense evidence during plea bargaining, but its reasoning appreciated 
somewhat how plea bargains differ from trials.7 With Padilla, the Court has 
now begun to interpret due process and the Sixth Amendment right to counsel 
to impose meaningful safeguards on the plea process.  
Padilla is the Court’s first case to treat plea bargaining as a subject worthy 
of constitutional regulation in its own right and on its own terms. By heeding 
plea-bargaining realities and evolving professional norms, the seven-Justice 
majority began to drag the law into the twenty-first century. The academy and 
the bar grasped the complexity of the plea process first, and the Court then 
recognized the consensus they had developed.8 Padilla represents the eclipse of 
Justice Scalia’s eighteenth-century formalism in criminal procedure, the parting 
triumph of Justice Stevens’s common-law incrementalism, and the emergence 
of Justices Alito and Sotomayor’s prosecutorial pragmatism. One can at least 
hope that the Court will persist in this new direction. Plea bargaining is no 
longer an insignificant corner of the market reserved for indisputably guilty 
people who need no protection beyond caveat emptor. Over the protests of 
Justices Scalia and Thomas, a solid majority of the Court at last sees that plea 
bargaining is the norm; sets the going rate; and needs consumer regulation and 
competent counsel to make it intelligent, voluntary, and just. That is a welcome 
first step, but it will also require rulemaking and legislation to complete the 
consumer-protection analogy. 
Part I of this Essay sketches the Court’s laissez-faire approach from 
roughly 1970 to 2000. It explores the assumptions underlying the Court’s hands-
off approach to plea bargaining even as the Court hypertrophied trial procedures.  
Part II then discusses Ruiz as a transitional moment on the Court, in which 
the Justices began to assess the realities of bargaining, albeit incompletely. 
Part III explains how Padilla at last recognizes that plea bargaining is now 
the norm and thus deserves tailored protection in its own right. I connect the 
dominance of bargaining to broader notions of innocence and injustice. I then 
explore how Padilla reconceives the roles of institutional actors and looks 
beyond simplistic bright-line dichotomies. I also weigh the concurring and 
dissenting Justices’ objections to the Court’s rule. Padilla, I conclude, reflects 
the eclipse of Justice Scalia’s formalist originalism, the parting triumph of 
Justice Stevens’s common-law incrementalism, and the rise of Justices Alito 
and Sotomayor’s prosecutorial realism. 
Part IV steps back to consider what broader reforms would help to 
complete the Padilla project. Since the criminal process is far too complicated 
and opaque to leave defendants at the mercy of caveat emptor, it is time to 
 
7. Id. at 633. See also infra notes 82–87 and accompanying text (explaining Ruiz’s 
reasoning). 
8. See infra notes 122–125 and accompanying text. 
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consider regulations modeled on consumer protection law. Padilla may prompt 
legislatures, rules committees, and bar authorities to complement the Court’s 
work. Finally, I conclude that the prosecutorial outlook of Justices Sotomayor 
and Alito, rather than traditional ideological divides, helps to explain the 
Court’s new plea-bargaining realism. 
I. 
THE TRIAL MODEL AND THE INVISIBILITY OF PLEAS 
From the 1970s through the early 2000s, plea bargains resolved the vast 
majority of criminal cases in the United States. But the Supreme Court’s case 
law remained stuck in the eighteenth century. Even as the Court noted and 
blessed the prevalence of pleas, its frame of reference remained the self-
contained criminal jury trial, uncluttered by sentencing or civil considerations. 
A. Efficiency, Originalism, and Formalism 
The Court adopted its hands-off approach to plea bargaining for an odd 
blend of reasons, ranging from sheer efficiency to anachronistic originalism. 
The seminal plea-bargaining cases, from around 1970, speak the technocratic 
language of efficiency. As Chief Justice Burger once wrote, plea bargaining “is 
an essential component of the administration of justice. Properly administered, 
it is to be encouraged.”9 Plea bargaining, he reasoned, handles large caseloads 
with a minimum of judicial and court resources.10 It has the added virtues of 
being prompt, final, and increasing rehabilitation and incapacitation.11 Justice 
White praised plea bargaining’s efficiency in similar terms in Brady v. United 
States, which upheld the use of promises of leniency to induce plea bargains.12 
Over the past decade or so, the Court’s originalist decisions have reached 
roughly the same result for very different reasons. They have declined to 
regulate plea bargaining because it is not a jury trial protected by the Sixth 
Amendment. Though Apprendi v. New Jersey held that the Sixth Amendment 
guarantees jury findings of all facts that aggravate maximum sentences, it 
exempted facts admitted by defendants.13 In his ringing originalist opinion in 
Blakely v. Washington, which extended Apprendi to facts that aggravate 
sentences under sentencing guidelines, Justice Scalia emphasized that 
defendants can freely waive Apprendi rights in plea bargaining.14 (Set aside 
the anachronism that Article III’s jury right was meant to be a nonwaivable 
 
  9. Santobello v. New York, 404 U.S. 257, 260 (1971) (vacating and remanding because a 
prosecutor failed to honor an earlier prosecutor’s commitment, as part of a plea bargain, to make 
no sentence recommendation). 
10. See id. 
11. Id. at 261. 
12. 397 U.S. 742, 752–53 (1970). 
13. Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 488 (2000). 
14. Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S. 296, 310 (2004). 
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structural check, so plea bargaining did not and could not exist in the 
eighteenth century.)15  
These holdings are not only originalist, but also formalist. Jury trials enjoy 
bright-line protection, while defendants who plead guilty can easily waive all of 
their rights. Twice, Justice Scalia has emphasized the need for a bright-line rule 
to protect jury trials (unless defendants choose to waive them).16 More 
generally, Justice Thomas has emphasized a strong presumption that all rights 
are waivable in plea bargaining as part of the laissez-faire give-and-take.17 
Criminal procedure thus becomes a binary on/off switch, fully enforced at jury 
trials but simply inapplicable in plea bargaining. The problem with bright-line 
rules such as Apprendi is that their edges are clear and so easy to evade, 
particularly when the rule is freely waivable.18 
These themes of efficiency, originalism, and formalism are evident in the 
parts that follow. As Parts I.B and I.C discuss, the Court’s focus on trials and 
lack of concern with sentencing tracked eighteenth-century procedures. This 
focus also reflected the practical difficulties of regulating off-the-record plea 
negotiations and advice. The Court’s faith in neutral judges and juries, noted in 
Part I.D, reflected the same considerations. And by dividing pleas from trials, 
civil collateral consequences from criminal sentences, and omissions from 
commission, the Court avoided thorny line-drawing issues. As Part I.E 
explains, the Court’s blinders blocked out factors beyond those characterizing 
the historical jury trial. 
B. Trials as the Norm 
The most notable feature of the pre-Padilla landscape is that trials 
remained the norm, the touchstone guiding the Court. Though the Court 
occasionally acknowledged the prevalence of pleas, until Padilla it did not 
cultivate rules tailored to make bargaining fair and substantively just.19 The 
focus of its criminal procedure regulation has long been ensuring fair trial 
 
15. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, cl. 3 (“The Trial of all Crimes . . . shall be by Jury” 
(emphases added)); Akhil Reed Amar, The Bill of Rights as a Constitution, 100 YALE L.J. 1131, 
1196–99 (1991). 
16. Blakely, 542 U.S. at 306–08, 310. See also Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 498–99 (Scalia, J., 
concurring) (“What ultimately demolishes the case for the dissenters is that they are unable to say 
what the right to trial by jury does guarantee if [not Apprendi’s bright-line rule]. They provide no 
coherent alternative.”). I have argued elsewhere that Justice Scalia’s originalism and formalism 
have powerfully shaped criminal procedure in recent years, particularly in the Apprendi and Blakely 
lines of cases. See Stephanos Bibas, Originalism and Formalism in Criminal Procedure: The 
Triumph of Justice Scalia, the Unlikely Friend of Criminal Defendants?, 94 GEO. L.J. 183 (2005). 
17. United States v. Mezzanatto, 513 U.S. 196, 200–03 (1995) (adopting a presumption of 
waivability, and holding that defendants may waive rules that exclude from evidence statements 
made during plea negotiations). 
18. See Bibas, supra note 16, at 198. 
19. For early Supreme Court cases acknowledging the prevalence or importance of guilty 
pleas or plea bargains, see Blackledge v. Allison, 431 U.S. 63, 71 (1977); Santobello v. New 
York, 404 U.S. 257, 260 (1971); Brady v. United States, 397 U.S. 742, 752 (1970). 
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procedures. A wide variety of doctrines reflect that trial emphasis. The Court 
has long required neutral decision makers at trial and steadily restricted 
discrimination in jury selection.20 Rules of evidence and motions in limine 
structure the presentation of proof for the jury’s consideration. Brady v. 
Maryland and Giglio v. United States require turning over exculpatory and 
impeachment evidence that jurors would likely find material in time for its 
effective use at trial.21 The requirements of confrontation and cross-
examination of witnesses ensure live, adversarial testing of the prosecution’s 
case in front of the jury.22 The privilege against compelled self-incrimination is 
so robust that it prevents even adverse comments on defendants’ silence at 
trial.23 The Court’s cases on proof beyond a reasonable doubt shape instructions 
to juries about when there is enough evidence to convict.24 And, in 2000, 
Apprendi read the Sixth Amendment’s jury-trial guarantee to require jury 
findings beyond a reasonable doubt of all facts that aggravate maximum 
sentences.25 The law of criminal procedure is primarily a law of trials and 
preparation for trials. 
The Court’s perspective reflected its criminal docket, which was (and still 
is) skewed toward reviewing convictions at trial. Most guilty pleas forfeit most 
rights that defendants could otherwise appeal.26 Defendants often waive many 
other rights in plea bargaining, even the right to appeal itself, so 
disproportionately few plea issues reach the Court.27 
 
20. E.g., Tumey v. Ohio, 273 U.S. 510 (1927) (forbidding judges to have direct monetary 
interests in the outcomes of cases); Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79 (1986) (forbidding race 
discrimination in criminal jury selection); J.E.B. v. Alabama ex rel. T.B., 511 U.S. 127 (1994) 
(extending Batson to sex discrimination). 
21. Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963) (exculpatory material); Giglio v. United States, 
405 U.S. 150 (1972) (impeachment material). 
22. E.g., Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36 (2004) (forbidding the use at trial of 
testimonial hearsay by nontestifying declarants); Bruton v. United States, 391 U.S. 123 (1968) 
(forbidding admission at joint trials of confessions implicating the accused by nontestifying 
codefendants).  
23. Griffin v. California, 380 U.S. 609 (1965). 
24. E.g., In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358 (1970) (requiring proof beyond a reasonable doubt 
for criminal convictions); see also Cage v. Louisiana, 498 U.S. 39 (1990) (per curiam) (reversing 
a criminal conviction because defective reasonable-doubt instruction permitted jury to convict 
based on insufficient proof). 
25. Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 490 (2000). See also Blakely v. Washington, 
542 U.S. 296, 303–04 (2004) (applying Apprendi to facts aggravating maxima under sentencing 
guidelines). 
26. See, e.g., United States v. Broce, 488 U.S. 563, 575–76 (1989) (holding that a guilty 
plea barred a later double jeopardy claim that relied on additional evidence); Tollett v. Henderson, 
411 U.S. 258, 266–67 (1973) (same, for claim of race discrimination in selecting grand jury); 
McMann v. Richardson, 397 U.S. 759, 768–71 (1970) (same, for coerced-confession claim). A 
few types of claims are not automatically forfeited by a plea. See Menna v. New York, 423 U.S. 
61, 62 (1975) (per curiam) (double jeopardy claim); Blackledge v. Perry, 417 U.S. 21, 30 (1974) 
(vindictive prosecutorial charging; describing these claims as exceptional because they undercut 
“the very power of the State” to charge the defendant). 
27. See, e.g., Cowan v. Superior Court, 926 P.2d 438, 441–43 (Cal. 1996) (allowing waiver 
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When the Court has reviewed guilty pleas, it has usually considered only 
the amount of knowledge defendants must have before waiving procedural trial 
rights.28 On this view, the plea process can remain effectively unregulated so 
long as the trial remains a regulated backstop. Plea bargaining supposedly takes 
place in the shadow of expected trial outcomes, so regulation of trials should 
theoretically protect plea-bargaining defendants as well.29 For the shadow of 
trial to work, defendants need know only that they are giving up their trial 
rights. Thus, plea colloquies must warn defendants that they are waiving their 
rights to jury trials, confrontation, and protection against self-incrimination.30 
The intricacies of the Rule 11 plea process, built upon this constitutional 
minimum, are almost exclusively procedural.31 The judge need mention only 
the rights being waived, the nature of the charges, the maximum and minimum 
penalties, and the vague existence of sentencing guidelines, and elicit a 
minimal factual basis for the plea.32 Judges need not opine on the likelihood of 
conviction, the probable sentence within the range, or the advisability of the 
bargain. On the contrary, the majority of jurisdictions forbid judges to take any 
part in bargaining.33 
 
of statute of limitations); People v. Allen, 658 N.E.2d 1012, 1014–15 (N.Y. 1995) (same, for 
double jeopardy); People v. Seaberg, 541 N.E.2d 1022, 1024–26 (N.Y. 1989) (same, for waivers 
of the right to appeal); see also Nancy J. King, Priceless Process: Non-Negotiable Features of 
Criminal Litigation, 47 UCLA L. REV. 113 (1999) (noting trend towards allowing waiver of all 
rights except constitutional claims that affect third parties). The Court has accelerated this trend by 
itself blessing plea-bargained waivers. E.g., United States v. Mezzanatto, 513 U.S. 196, 200–02, 
210 (1995) (adopting a presumption of waivability and enforcing a waiver of the inadmissibility 
of statements a defendant made during plea negotiations). 
The existence of appeal waivers, however, does not entirely explain the dearth of plea-
bargaining case law. Defendants can enter conditional guilty pleas, expressly reserving their rights 
to appeal specified pretrial issues. E.g., FED. R. CRIM. P. 11(a)(2). And it does not explain the 
paucity of case law on issues that go to the validity of the plea, such as the Ruiz issues of when 
and how prosecutors’ Brady obligations attach. 
28. E.g., Iowa v. Tovar, 541 U.S. 77, 81 (2004) (holding that, at guilty-plea colloquies, 
judges need not advise defendants of the specific risks of waiving counsel and proceeding pro se); 
McMann, 397 U.S. at 770–71 (1970) (holding that “a defendant’s plea of guilty based on 
reasonably competent advice is an intelligent plea not open to attack on the ground that counsel 
may have misjudged the admissibility of the defendant’s confession”); Boykin v. Alabama, 395 
U.S. 238, 243 (1969) (holding that, to demonstrate that a guilty plea is voluntary, the record must 
reflect that the defendant affirmatively waived his rights to a jury trial and to confront his 
accusers, as well as his privilege against compelled self-incrimination).  
29. I have critiqued this widespread assumption. Stephanos Bibas, Plea Bargaining Outside 
the Shadow of Trial, 117 HARV. L. REV. 2463 (2004). 
30. Boykin, 395 U.S. at 242–43. 
31. FED. R. CRIM. P. 11. Rule 11 establishes the federal procedures for plea bargaining and 
has served as a model for many states. E.g., HAW. R. PEN. P. 11; TENN. R. CRIM. P. 11; VT. R. 
CRIM. P. 11; W. VA. R. CRIM. P. 11. 
32. FED. R. CRIM. P. 11(b)(1), (b)(3). 
33. E.g., FED. R. CRIM. P. 11(c)(1); COLO. REV. STAT. § 16-7-302(1) (2006); GA. UNIF. 
SUPER. CT. R. 33.5(A). For cogent criticism of this judicial reticence, see Albert W. Alschuler, 
The Trial Judge’s Role in Plea Bargaining (pt. 1), 76 COLUM. L. REV. 1059, 1123–34 (1976).  
Anecdotal evidence suggests that judges do on occasion participate in plea bargaining, 
sometimes in violation of local rules. One study found that about a third of judges nationwide 
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The underlying justification for this laissez-faire approach is that plea 
bargaining is a positive good and that defendants can decide for themselves 
when bargains serve their interests.34 In 1970, in Brady v. United States, Justice 
White explained that plea bargains serve everybody’s interests: defendants who 
stand little chance of acquittal get reduced sentences, avoid burdensome trials, 
and get their cases over with.35 In theory, by admitting guilt, they show that 
they are more open to rehabilitation and so need less punishment. The 
government saves time and money for cases that need it and increases the 
swiftness of punishment. This “mutuality of advantage” supposedly makes plea 
bargaining rational, fair, and efficient.36 Trials remain as benchmarks against 
which both sides can measure their mutual advantages and as fallbacks against 
bargaining coercion.  
On this account, defendants can freely and voluntarily choose to plead 
guilty. The only limitations are that they must face no threats, 
misrepresentations, or bribes, and have competent counsel and time to weigh 
the pros and cons of trial.37 While recognizing that the plea process “is no more 
foolproof than full trials,” the Court expressed confidence that judges at plea 
hearings would ensure the accuracy and reliability of convictions to prevent 
convictions of the innocent.38 But that judicial oversight need not screen out 
many pleas. Even a defendant who protests his own innocence can plead guilty, 
so long as the prosecutor and defense lawyer furnish a “strong factual basis” by 
articulating the facts they would prove at trial.39 And the ban on threats and 
promises conveniently exempts those threats and promises integral to the plea 




attended plea negotiations, most often reviewing the parties’ recommendations but occasionally 
making their own. Where rules clearly forbade participation in plea bargaining, judges were much 
less likely to attend, but some still did. John Paul Ryan & James J. Alfini, Trial Judges’ 
Participation in Plea Bargaining: An Empirical Perspective, 13 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 479, 484–90 
(1979). Cf. Allen Anderson, Judicial Participation in the Plea Negotiation Process: Some 
Frequencies and Disposing Factors, 10 HAMLINE J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 39, 43–49, 57 (1990) (repor-
ting that “[j]udicial participation in the plea negotiation process, in varying forms, is widespread,” 
based on a study of North Carolina, which expressly authorizes judges to participate). 
34. Frank Easterbrook has made this free-market argument powerfully several times. Frank 
H. Easterbrook, Criminal Procedure as a Market System, 12 J. LEGAL STUD. 289, 309–17 (1983); 
Frank H. Easterbrook, Plea Bargaining as Compromise, 101 YALE L.J. 1969, 1974–75 (1992).  
35. 397 U.S. 742, 752 (1970). 
36. Id. at 752–53. See also Santobello v. New York, 404 U.S. 257, 260–61 (1971). 
37. Brady, 397 U.S. at 752, 754–55. 
38. Id. at 758. 
39. North Carolina v. Alford, 400 U.S. 25, 37–38 (1970). 
40. The landmark approval of lawful threats as part of the rough-and-tumble of plea 
bargaining is Bordenkircher v. Hayes, 434 U.S. 357, 362–65. For a cogent critique of 
Bordenkircher’s opening the floodgates to unfettered plea bargaining, see William J. Stuntz, 
Bordenkircher v. Hayes: Plea Bargaining and the Decline of the Rule of Law, in CRIMINAL 
PROCEDURE STORIES 351 (Carol Steiker ed., 2006). 
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The Court put great faith in competent defense counsel as the only 
substantial safeguard.41 As long as lawyers offered competent advice, even if 
they turned out to be wrong in hindsight, defendants supposedly could 
forecast whether pleas served their self-interests.42 That romanticized vision, 
however, ignored the workloads, underfunding, and agency costs that beset 
defense lawyers and the difficulties of proving incompetence on undeveloped 
plea records.43  
Also, like many economists, the Court’s account assumed that the parties 
had good information and treated uncertainty as a mere matter of rationally 
forecasting probabilities of conviction.44 The Court seemed to presume that 
most defendants know their own guilt and the evidence likely to be marshaled 
against them at trial.45 That stylized assumption collided with the reality that 
criminal discovery is far less expansive than civil discovery, even though 
 
41. Here and over the next several pages, I discuss more generally the Court’s tacit 
assumptions for more than three decades, from the 1970s through the early 2000s. One cannot 
rigorously prove such generalizations, particularly when it comes to proving negatives, such as the 
Court’s failure to advert to the realities of plea bargaining. For a concrete example, however, of an 
opinion that would have been written differently had the Court not made these assumptions and 
instead assessed plea bargaining more realistically, see my discussion of United States v. Ruiz. 
Infra Part II. 
42. McMann v. Richardson, 397 U.S. 759, 769–71 (1970). See also Libretti v. United 
States, 516 U.S. 29, 50–51 (1995) (“Apart from the small class of rights that require specific 
advice from the court under Rule 11(c), it is the responsibility of defense counsel to inform a 
defendant of the advantages and disadvantages of a plea agreement and the attendant statutory and 
constitutional rights that a guilty plea would forgo.”). 
43. Albert Alschuler’s classic examination of defense lawyers remains the best study of 
their role in plea bargaining. Albert W. Alschuler, The Defense Attorney’s Role in Plea 
Bargaining, 84 YALE L.J. 1179, 1180 (1975) (describing the assumption that defense counsel will 
adequately safeguard their clients’ interests in plea bargaining as “often more romanticized than 
real”). I have contributed to this literature, in particular by discussing the problems of gauging in-
effectiveness in hindsight. Bibas, supra note 29, at 2476–86; Stephanos Bibas, The Psychology of 
Hindsight and After-the-Fact Review of Ineffective Assistance of Counsel, 2003 UTAH L. REV. 1. 
44. See, e.g., Oren Bar-Gill & Oren Gazal Ayal, Plea Bargains Only for the Guilty, 49 J.L. 
& ECON. 353, 361–62 (2006) (“In most cases, key evidence, including the defendant’s statement 
to the police and the identity of the main witnesses, is common knowledge. In many jurisdictions, 
law or prosecutorial practice guarantees that defendants receive the most significant information 
collected by the prosecution, thus minimizing private information on the prosecution side.”); see 
also Brady v. United States, 397 U.S. 742, 756–58 (1970) (treating the decision to plead guilty as 
“intelligently made” because it is based on “the defendant’s appraisal of the prosecution’s case 
against him and by the apparent likelihood of securing leniency”); McMann, 397 U.S. at 770–71 
(suggesting that “uncertainty is inherent in predicting court decisions” and that predicting likely 
outcomes is a normal part of defense counsel’s job). 
45. See, e.g., North Carolina v. Alford, 400 U.S. 25, 37–39 (1970) (stressing that 
“[w]hether [Alford] realized or disbelieved his guilt,” upon his lawyer’s advice he had rationally 
decided to plead guilty “[b]ecause of the overwhelming evidence against him”). Cf. Bar-Gill & 
Ayal, supra note 44, at 361 (economic model assuming good information through common 
knowledge and discovery, particularly defendant’s knowledge of his own guilt); Robert E. Scott & 
William J. Stuntz, Plea Bargaining as Contract, 101 YALE L.J. 1909, 1936–37 (1992) (stressing 
that defendant’s knowledge of his own guilt gives him “a major piece of information that” the 
prosecutor lacks).  
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criminal defendants have far more at stake.46 It also ignored the many 
psychological biases and heuristics that color defendants’ assessments of their 
own cases in plea bargaining.47  
The Court’s view of trial-based plea bargaining was thus rather idealized 
and static. It focused on the law on the books, such as the elements of the 
crime, the statutory punishments, and especially the procedural rights exercised 
or waived. The Court did not consider or did not care that plea bargaining 
would likely undercut or pervert trial regulations in practice.48 And it assumed 
that good information and competent counsel would suffice to ensure rational, 
orderly, trial-based bargaining within these boundaries. That assumption was 
far too rosy. 
C. Guilt Without a Sense of Sentencing 
Until the early 2000s, the Court’s world was binary: defendants were 
either guilty or not guilty. It ignored the varieties of possible charges and the 
gradations of sentences that might fit a crime. It assumed that guilt alone 
matters and that defendants know their own guilt. Innocent, intoxicated, and 
insane defendants, however, may not know the evidence against themselves. 
The Court may also have assumed that innocent defendants would not confess 
or plead guilty, but DNA exonerations show that a fraction do, especially 
mentally retarded and juvenile defendants.49 Even typical defendants may not 
know or be able to use potentially mitigating sentencing facts. Poor lawyering, 
for example, can impede defendants’ efforts to cooperate with government 
investigations.50 And lack of discovery can prevent them from showing at 
sentencing that their victims suffered little lasting harm. 
In this vein, the Court also neglected the importance of sentencing to plea 
bargaining. It took trials as the norm and thus post-trial punishments as the 
normative baseline. Prosecutors can lawfully threaten any charges and 
 
46. See Weatherford v. Bursey, 429 U.S. 545, 559 (1977) (“There is no general 
constitutional right to discovery in a criminal case . . . .”); Bibas, supra note 29, at 2493–96. 
47. I have explored this problem at length elsewhere. Bibas, supra note 29, at 2496–2519. 
48. I have argued at length that the Court erred by writing criminal procedure decisions 
such as Apprendi for the 5 percent of cases that go to trial, heedless of how the parties would 
circumvent or pervert these rules in the 95 percent of cases that plead guilty. Stephanos Bibas, 
Judicial Fact-Finding and Sentence Enhancements in a World of Guilty Pleas, 110 YALE L.J. 
1097, 1148–51 (2001). 
49. Compare, e.g., Brady v. United States, 397 U.S. 742, 757–58 (1970) (doubting that 
inducements to plead guilty “substantially increased the likelihood that” innocent defendants 
would plead guilty), with Brandon L. Garrett, The Substance of False Confessions, 62 STAN. L. 
REV. 1051, 1064 (2010) (reporting that mentally ill, mentally retarded, and borderline mentally 
retarded defendants composed 43 percent of DNA exonerees who had falsely confessed; 65 
percent of false confessors were mentally disabled, under eighteen at the time of the crime, or 
both), and Samuel R. Gross, Convicting the Innocent, 4 ANN. REV. L. & SOC. SCI. 173, 181 
(2008) (discussing a study of 340 nonrandomly selected defendants who pled guilty, finding that 6 
percent were later exonerated). 
50. Bibas, supra note 29, at 2485–86. 
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sentences which they have probable cause to bring. Against this backdrop, plea 
offers look like favorable discounts. Hence, some courts hold that a defendant 
can never be prejudiced by an attorney’s error that causes him to go to trial, 
because he has not been deprived of his constitutional right to a fair trial.51 That 
static picture misses an important fact: now that bargaining is the norm, its 
existence warps the baseline penalties. Legislatures multiply overlapping 
criminal statutes and inflate sentences to give prosecutors extra plea-bargaining 
chips.52 Charges are not exogenously specified by natural law, but endogenous 
to the criminal process. A range of possible overlapping charges can fit a single 
transaction or episode, and prosecutors have discretion to choose among them 
to reflect their own senses of justice, their desires to achieve pleas, or any 
number of reasons. When prosecutors threaten inflated post-trial sentences to 
induce pleas, defendants are less free to test their guilt at trial.53 Defendants 
may be better off if they play the game well but much worse off if they do not. 
Ignoring sentencing was at least understandable in the older world of 
indeterminate or unstructured sentencing. Through most of the twentieth 
century, most statutes set only broad punishment ranges. Judges enjoyed almost 
unfettered discretion within those ranges, so lawyers could not confidently 
predict eventual sentences or the facts that would influence them. Much was 
left to the discretion of parole authorities, who made their rehabilitative 
decisions much later, on the back end.54 But over the last four decades, the 
truth-in-sentencing movement has abolished or greatly restricted parole in 
many states.55 At the same time, the federal and many state systems have 
adopted mandatory minimum penalties and structured sentencing guidelines. 
Particularly in the federal system, specific facts trigger predictable sentencing 
consequences, as do charge bargains, sentence bargains, and decisions to 
cooperate with police and prosecutors.56 Investigation and negotiation over 
 
51. E.g., United States v. Springs, 988 F.2d 746, 749 (7th Cir. 1993) (Easterbrook, J.); State 
v. Greuber, 165 P.3d 1185, 1190 (Utah 2007); Bryan v. State, 134 S.W.3d 795, 802 (Mo. Ct. App. 
2004) (finding no prejudice); State v. Monroe, 757 So.2d 895, 898 (La. Ct. App. 2000) (same). See 
also infra note 116 for information about next Term’s cases, Lefler v. Cooper and Missouri v. Frye. 
52. Bill Stuntz beautifully exposed this phenomenon in William J. Stuntz, The Pathological 
Politics of Criminal Law, 100 MICH. L. REV. 505, 534–38, 546–52 (2001). 
53. Studying plea and conviction statistics across the second half of the twentieth century, 
Ronald Wright concludes that many federal defendants who would otherwise have been acquitted 
at trial have increasingly pleaded guilty instead. He blames this development in substantial part on 
increased prosecutorial power. Federal prosecutors, he notes, have become increasingly able to 
threaten large penalties for going to trial and to promise large rewards for pleading guilty. Ronald 
F. Wright, Trial Distortion and the End of Innocence in Federal Criminal Justice, 154 U. PA. L. 
REV. 79, 84–86, 100–12, 129–37, 150–54 (2005). 
54. See generally LAWRENCE M. FRIEDMAN, CRIME AND PUNISHMENT IN AMERICAN 
HISTORY 159–63, 304–06 (1993); KATE STITH & JOSÉ A. CABRANES, FEAR OF JUDGING: 
SENTENCING GUIDELINES IN THE FEDERAL COURTS 9–10, 18–21 (1998). 
55. See PAULA M. DITTON & DORIS JAMES WILSON, OFFICE OF JUSTICE PROGRAMS, U.S. 
DEP’T OF JUSTICE, NCJ 170032, TRUTH IN SENTENCING IN STATES PRISONS 1, 3 (1999), available 
at http://bjs.ojp.usdoj.gov/content/pub/pdf/tssp.pdf. 
56. Bibas, supra note 29, at 2483–91. 
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these factors predictably influence whether sentences track what defendants 
deserve.57 And, increasingly, certain convictions trigger automatic collateral 
consequences, such as deportation or sex-offender residency restrictions.58 By 
the start of the twenty-first century, the Court’s blindness to sentencing and 
related consequences had grown antiquated. 
D. Faith in Neutral Arbiters 
The Court’s preoccupation with trials had another important component. It 
trusted that public trials run by neutral judges and juries would discipline both 
sides, develop factual records for appellate scrutiny, and ensure justice. It 
assumed that trial judges remained informed overseers who could referee 
disputes between prosecutors and defense counsel. They could do so 
knowledgeably, based on their first-hand exposure to the evidence at motions 
hearings and trials. There was little sense that judges usually played reactive 
roles, dependent on the parties’ representations about the facts and pressured to 
rubber-stamp plea bargains as faits accomplis. 
Likewise, the Court has traditionally seen protecting juries as a central 
part of its mission. It has elaborated the Batson line of cases to protect the 
representative jury as the conscience of the community.59 It interpreted the 
Confrontation Clause in Crawford to ensure that jurors hear live witnesses and 
can gauge their reliability.60 And it has protected juries’ role in authorizing 
maximum sentences under the Sixth Amendment’s Jury Trial Clause. Apprendi 
and its progeny emphasized that juries must check judges’ and prosecutors’ 
decisions to punish defendants for aggravated crimes.61 
The Court appears to have understood these arbiters as fairly simple, 
static, and unitary. The vision was one of strict, static separation of powers, not 
of fluid checks and balances; there was little sense of a dialogue among the 
various actors or branches, let alone the kind of game that characterizes plea 
bargaining. The Apprendi dissenters would have preserved more leeway for 
legislatures and sentencing commissions to experiment by, for instance, 
adopting sentencing guidelines.62 The Blakely dissenters argued for flexible, 
dynamic judicial discretion to counteract prosecutors’ charge-bargaining power 
 
57. Id. 
58. See, e.g., Padilla v. Kentucky, 130 S. Ct. 1473, 1481 (2010) (deportation); Corey 
Rayburn Yung, Banishment by a Thousand Laws: Residency Restrictions on Sex Offenders, 85 
WASH. U. L. REV. 101 (2007) (sex offender residency restrictions). 
59. E.g., J.E.B. v. Alabama ex rel. T.B., 511 U.S. 127 (1994); Powers v. Ohio, 499 U.S. 
400 (1991); Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79 (1986). 
60. Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36 (2004). 
61. E.g., Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S. 296 (2004); Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 
466, 490 (2000). 
62. Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 550–52 (O’Connor, J., dissenting); id. at 560–66 (Breyer, J., 
dissenting). Concurring, Justice Scalia mocked these “admirably fair and efficient” reforms as a 
“bureaucratic realm of perfect equity” divorced from the Sixth Amendment’s guarantee of trial by 
jury. Id. at 498 (Scalia, J., concurring). 
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and Procrustean sentences.63 The majorities in both cases, however, rejected 
these functionalist arguments for fairness and cooperation among the branches. 
Instead, they placed their faith in juries as a brake on judges and prosecutors. 
That faith assumed, of course, that there were still meaningful numbers of jury 
trials left to save. The majorities also assumed that juries authorize punishments 
in some meaningful sense, even though they cannot be told and must not 
consider the likely sentences.64 
E. Clean Dichotomies 
Finally, the Court’s traditional approach to plea bargaining assumed 
several neat categories dividing various areas of law. It assumed clear lines 
between guilty pleas and jury trials, and between the guilt phase and sentencing 
proceedings. It focused on regulating guilt verdicts at trial. It thus trusted that 
forecasted trial verdicts would cast shadows on the substance of plea bargain-
ing, obviating much procedural regulation of pleas. It put its faith in proceed-
ings on the record, easily subject to review by trial and appellate judges.  
An even bigger oversight was the artificial separation of criminal from 
civil and, in particular, of direct criminal consequences from collateral civil 
ones. The criminal proceeding was a self-contained unit with well-defined 
aims: the prosecution sought a verdict of guilty on the exogenously specified 
charge, while the defense sought a complete acquittal on the same single 
charge. Judges and criminal lawyers could control and had to explain only 
those consequences labeled criminal, not civil. Thus, for example, the 
protections of double jeopardy do not apply to civil penalties.65 At plea 
colloquies, judges had to explain only the direct consequences of a plea, such 
as the minimum and maximum sentences and any fine, forfeiture, or 
probation.66 Other consequences fell beyond the sentencing judge’s purview. 
The neat walls between criminal and civil, and between direct and 
collateral consequences, have steadily eroded in recent years. Statutory reforms 
have increasingly specified that certain crimes trigger deportation and have 
made it automatic.67 Other laws have mandated registration, housing and job 
restrictions, and even civil commitment of those convicted of certain sex-
related crimes, even minor ones such as consensual teenage sex.68 Drug crimes 
 
63. Blakely, 542 U.S. at 330–40 (Breyer, J., dissenting). 
64. Compare Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 494 (asking whether an enhancement “expose[s] the 
defendant to a greater punishment than that authorized by the jury’s guilty verdict”), with Shannon 
v. United States, 512 U.S. 573, 587 (1994) (reiterating “the rule against informing jurors of the 
consequences of their verdicts” and rejecting a proposed exception). 
65. Hudson v. United States, 522 U.S. 93, 101–03 (1997). 
66. Brady v. United States, 397 U.S. 742, 755 (1970); FED. R. CRIM. P. 11 (b)(1)(H)–(M). 
67. Padilla v. Kentucky, 130 S. Ct. 1473, 1478–80 (2010). 
68. See, e.g., WAYNE A. LOGAN, KNOWLEDGE AS POWER: CRIMINAL REGISTRATION AND 
COMMUNITY NOTIFICATION LAWS IN AMERICA 49–84 (2009); Jenny Roberts, Ignorance Is 
Effectively Bliss: Collateral Consequences, Silence, and Misinformation in the Guilty-Plea 
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likewise carry many collateral consequences.69 The distinction between a three-
day prison sentence and the deportation or civil confinement triggered by that 
sentence has become increasingly arbitrary. Defendants might care much more 
about the latter, and the lawyers might well trade off criminal against civil 
consequences via plea bargaining to make the overall penalties fit the crime. 
Finally, the Court’s laissez-faire approach assumed a sharp line between 
sins of commission and mere omissions. The state could not misrepresent the 
facts or affirmatively conceal evidence.70 But judges and prosecutors had little 
responsibility to assist the defense.71 The state’s obligation was simply to avoid 
obstructing the defense and to provide minimal procedural information at the 
plea colloquy. It had no obligation to offer any substantive guidance on the 
merits of a proposed disposition. Defense lawyers might offer sound advice, 
poor advice, or simply tell their clients to take pleas without much explanation. 
Often, defendants were largely on their own in discerning whether a proposed 
plea deal was favorable, had strings attached, or was a bluff to hide a 
prosecutor’s weak hand.  
* * * 
By roughly the turn of the millennium, the Court’s criminal procedure 
jurisprudence had grown quite lopsided. It focused on unrepresentative Cadillac 
jury trials, embellished with cumbersome procedures, to protect defendants 
against overbearing state power. The Court reviewed disproportionately fewer 
guilty pleas, and when it did it took a hands-off approach. The very same state 
against which defendants needed to be protected at trial could issue any number 
of lawful threats in bargaining. It could thus induce most defendants to 
surrender their Cadillac trials in exchange for scooter plea bargains. 
Prosecutors easily circumvented the hypertrophied protections for 5 percent of 
cases in the remaining, lightly regulated 95 percent. Plea waivers had to follow 
elaborate scripted procedures to ensure that defendants knew they were waiving 
a host of procedural rights of little interest to them. Yet the waiver process was 
oddly silent about the substantive advisability of the sentences and 
consequences being offered, and it required far less than proof of guilt beyond a 
reasonable doubt. The plea process trusted defendants and their lawyers to 
figure out their interests with little help or safeguard. Given the chronic 
 
Process, 95 IOWA L. REV. 119, 176, 179–80, 182–83 (2009); Yung, supra note 58; Sex Laws: 
Unjust and Ineffective, ECONOMIST, Aug. 6, 2009, at 21 (giving example of a seventeen-year-old 
girl who had to register publicly as a sex offender for performing fellatio on a boy aged fifteen 
years, eleven months). 
69. Gabriel J. Chin, Race, The War on Drugs, and the Collateral Consequences of 
Criminal Conviction, 6 J. GENDER RACE & JUST. 253 (2002). 
70. E.g., Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 87 (1963); Mooney v. Holohan, 294 U.S. 103 
(1935). 
71. See, e.g., Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 693 (1984) (“The government is not 
responsible for, and hence not able to prevent, [defense] attorney errors . . . .”); Weatherford v. 
Bursey, 429 U.S. 545, 559 (1977) (“There is no general constitutional right to discovery in a 
criminal case . . . .”). 
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problems of overworked, underfunded, incompetent, and conflicted defense 
counsel, that assumption was myopic.72 
II. 
RUIZ AND A DAWNING APPRECIATION OF PLEA REALITIES 
So matters stood until about a decade ago. In 2002, the Court in Ruiz had 
to grapple with a new plea-bargaining phenomenon: the rise of fast-track guilty 
pleas, which waive even more rights than usual in exchange for steep discounts. 
In many ways, as Part II.A notes, Ruiz extended the Court’s previous 
incomprehension of plea bargaining. In approving fast-track pleas, the Court 
continued to focus on fair trials and trusted defendants to know their own guilt. 
Yet, as Part II.B explains, some of Ruiz’s reasoning evinced a greater 
appreciation of both the benefits and pitfalls of plea negotiations. Ultimately, 
Ruiz was unclear on just how much the Court would modify its hands-off faith 
in plea bargaining. 
A. Continued Emphasis on Proof of Guilt at Trial 
Judicial districts in southwestern America, near the Mexican border, have 
been overwhelmed with far more immigration and drug cases than they can 
handle. In response, federal prosecutors in many of those districts developed 
fast-track plea-bargaining programs. The seminal program required defendants 
to waive indictment, forego motions, plead guilty immediately, waive 
presentence reports, stipulate to a particular sentence, agree to immediate 
sentencing, consent to deportation, and waive all sentencing and deportation 
appeals. In exchange, prosecutors stipulated to sentences substantially below 
what defendants would have received after trial.73 
Angela Ruiz was caught smuggling thirty kilograms of marijuana into the 
United States. As part of a fast-track program, prosecutors offered Ruiz a six-
month discount, reducing her sentencing guidelines range from eighteen-to-
twenty-four months down to twelve-to-eighteen months. They represented that 
the government had already turned over and would continue to turn over any 
known information showing the defendant’s factual innocence. The proposed 
plea agreement, however, asked defendants to waive their rights to 
impeachment information and evidence supporting affirmative defenses, in 
addition to many of the other waivers listed above.74 The questions for the 




72. See generally, e.g., AM. BAR ASS’N, GIDEON’S BROKEN PROMISE: AMERICA’S 
CONTINUING QUEST FOR EQUAL JUSTICE (2004). 
73. Alan D. Bersin & Judith S. Feigin, The Rule of Law at the Margin: Reinventing 
Prosecution Policy in the Southern District of California, 12 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 285, 301 (1998). 
74. United States v. Ruiz, 536 U.S. 622, 625 (2002). 
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affirmative-defense information during plea bargaining and, if so, whether 
these discovery rights were waivable.75  
The Court held that there is no constitutional right to this discovery before 
a plea, for several reasons.76 First, Brady and its progeny recognized a due 
process right to a fair trial. When the government lays its cards down on the 
table at trial, the Court implied, the jury needs to see impeachment information 
to complete the picture.77 But during plea bargaining the government need not 
reveal the incriminating evidence, so there is no need to disclose prematurely 
the impeachment evidence or affirmative defenses undercutting it.78 
Concurring, Justice Thomas went further, saying that Brady was limited to 
ensuring fair trials, not providing helpful information in time for a plea.79 The 
Court evinced little appreciation of the need to guide defendants in making 
informed, reasoned decisions. 
Second, voluntariness does not require full discovery or knowledge of all 
incriminating evidence. Defendants can waive rights if they understand them 
generally, even if they cannot foresee the specific detailed consequences of 
invoking those rights. They have no right to full discovery or full information. 
Indeed, they may plead guilty even if they misunderstand the evidence against 
them or the law likely to apply to them.80 And the importance of impeachment 
information will vary depending on how much defendants independently know 
about the prosecution’s case,81 not based on how likely they are to be innocent. 
Third, the Court dismissed the fear that poor information might harm 
innocent defendants. At trial, failure to reveal impeachment evidence could 
lead a jury to convict erroneously. But innocent defendants are very unlikely to 
plead guilty, the Court assumed. It reasoned that the prosecution’s continuing 
promise to turn over exculpatory evidence and the procedural safeguards of 
Rule 11 diminish the risk of a false guilty plea.82 
At oral argument, several Justices showed even less concern about the 
justice of plea-bargaining outcomes. Justice Scalia assumed that defendants 
would know their own defenses,83 which is often true of self-defense but less 
true of entrapment and the like. Justices Souter and Ginsburg stressed that Ruiz 
had admitted guilt, suggesting that she had no need for discovery to know her 
 
75. Id. at 628. 
76. Id. at 625. 
77. Id. at 629–30. 
78. Id. at 629–30, 633. 
79. Id. at 633–34 (Thomas, J., concurring). 
80. Id. at 629–31 (majority opinion). 
81. Id. at 630. 
82. Id. at 631 (stating that the factors noted in the text allay the fear “that, in the absence of 
impeachment information, innocent individuals, accused of crimes, will plead guilty”). 
83. Transcript of Oral Argument at 32–33, United States v. Ruiz, 536 U.S. 622 (2002) (No. 
01-595) (“[I]t’s impossible for [a defendant] not to know whether he was acting in self-defense.” 
(Scalia, J.)). See http://www.oyez.org/cases/2000-2009/2001/2001_01_595/argument. 
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own guilt.84 Justice Scalia went further, stressing that our system never permits 
or encourages innocent defendants to plead guilty. On his view, more discovery 
would merely tell a defendant “what the house odds are . . . before he rolls the 
dice by pleading guilty.”85 At best, he implied, this discovery would encourage 
tactical gamesmanship by the guilty; at worst, it would encourage innocent 
defendants to enter false pleas of guilty.86 
Note here the continuing impact of the classic trial model. The game is a 
static one, in which defendants know their guilt and the likely sentences after 
trial versus plea. They are rational and well informed, able to weigh proba-
bilities and uncertainties. Trials set normative baselines, which plea bargains 
simply sweeten. Innocent defendants know their innocence and will not be 
tempted to plead, and the categories of guilt or innocence are black and white. 
It did not help that Ruiz’s case, like many of the fast-track cases, was 
open and shut, with an unequivocal admission of guilt and no apparent 
defense.87 That setting only sharpened the Court’s dichotomy between the 
guilty and the innocent. It also stripped away any justification other than 
gamesmanship for discovery. 
Even so, a couple of Justices saw beyond the dichotomy between guilt and 
innocence. At oral argument, Justice Breyer stressed that prosecutors wield 
overwhelming power in plea bargaining, which could tempt innocent 
defendants to plead guilty. Providing more information, he noted, could help to 
counterbalance prosecutors.88 And Justice Souter disagreed with Justice Scalia, 
noting that innocent defendants might indeed enter Alford guilty pleas, but that 
more information about weaknesses in the prosecution’s case might thus steel 
their resolve to vindicate themselves at trial.89  
These few caveats expressed at oral argument were not reflected in the 
Ruiz opinions. Nor did the Court evince much appreciation for the different 
types of information at issue. The Court spent most of its opinion discussing 
impeachment information, which is tangential to the evidence of guilt. Only in 
one paragraph at the end did it extend the same reasoning to evidence of 
affirmative defenses.90 But affirmative-defense evidence can be far more 
central to blameworthiness and guilt than impeachment information. Evidence 
 
84. Id. at 28–29. 
85. Id. at 12. 
86. Id. at 19–20 (“I mean, there’s something wrong with a legal system that . . . is even 
contemplating [encouraging innocent defendants to plead guilty.]”); id. at 26 (“There is nothing in 
our system that encourages or even allows an innocent person to—to plead guilty. And I would be 
horrified if—if there were something like that.”); id. at 32–33 (“Other provisions of our laws make 
it very clear that we are not to accept guilty pleas from innocent people,” and defendants do not 
need discovery to know if they have a possible self-defense claim or the like). 
87. Id. at 38–39 (noting the oddity of considering the issue in a case with no suggestion of 
innocence).  
88. Id. at 17–18. 
89. Id. at 34–35. See http://www.oyez.org/cases/2000-2009/2001/2001_01_595/argument. 
90. United States v. Ruiz, 536 U.S. 622, 633 (2002). 
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of a murder victim’s history of aggression, for example, could be highly 
relevant to self-defense. Yet murder defendants may not have access to rap 
sheets and other evidence documenting past violence. Drug defendants are even 
less likely to know that their suppliers were government agents who entrapped 
them. Ruiz’s rule will apply to many cases where evidence of guilt is less clear 
and more important to innocent or less blameworthy defendants. 
B. A Dawning Awareness of the Plea Process 
Alongside Ruiz’s old-style thinking, however, were passages reflecting a 
more modern, nuanced understanding of pleas, one that weighed the need for 
discovery against its costs. The majority opinion stressed that the Government 
had not sought waiver of its bedrock obligation to disclose classic exculpatory 
evidence. As noted, the Court took comfort in the prosecution’s representations 
that it had and would continue to disclose exculpatory evidence.91 
Given the backstop of the prosecution’s promise of disclosure, the Court 
felt more secure trading off the need for additional discovery against other 
goals. Defendants have some interest in gathering enough information to make 
informed decisions and guard against bluffing. But, on the other side of the 
scales, the Court accorded substantial weight to the Government’s 
countervailing reasons for nondisclosure.92 As the Court recognized, the 
Government has a strong interest in securing efficient guilty pleas by factually 
guilty defendants who are willing to plead.93 Discovery of impeachment 
information risks revealing undercover officers and confidential informants, as 
well as exposing prospective witnesses to tampering, threats, and violence. 
Congress and Federal Rules Committees have thus drawn existing witness-
disclosure requirements carefully to minimize these risks.94 
1. Impeachment Evidence  
The Court saw that it would be too burdensome to force the Government 
to turn over all impeachment evidence in time for plea bargaining.95 It should 
also have emphasized the costs to defendants of fettering free trade. Plea 
bargaining expands the pie by freeing the government to seek more convictions 
at a lower cost per case. In exchange, the government splits the gains from 
trade, rewarding individual defendants with lower sentences. Reducing the 
 
91. Id. at 631; supra text accompanying note 82. 
92. Ruiz, 536 U.S. at 631 (noting that due process balances a defendant’s interest and need 
for information against the Government’s interest in not disclosing information). Justice Thomas 
disclaimed even this modest, pragmatic balancing. Id. at 633–34 (Thomas, J., concurring in the 
judgment) (declining to join majority opinion because he drew a bright line between the plea and 
trial stages, irrespective of how important the information might be to defendants before 
pleading guilty).  
93. Id. at 631 (majority opinion). 
94. Id. at 631–32. 
95. Id. at 632.  
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ability to keep undercover officers and cooperating witnesses confidential 
greatly decreases their future usefulness. Exposing witnesses to tampering and 
threats harms innocent witnesses and reduces their willingness to come 
forward. These are entirely legitimate reasons why the government bargains for 
nondisclosure, not nefarious ones aimed at hiding a weak case. If the 
government cannot save these costs, it will be much less willing to bargain and 
will offer correspondingly less generous terms. Defendants, as well as the 
government, would be worse off if they could not bargain away their right to 
inflict these costs. 
2. Affirmative Defense Evidence  
It is not at all clear that the same analysis applies to evidence of 
affirmative defenses, which need not come from a protected witness. A 
vestigial paragraph at the end of Ruiz quickly analogized this evidence to 
impeachment material, without considering whether the costs and benefits are 
comparable.96 Perhaps much of this information ought to be waivable, but that 
would require subtler analysis of the costs of disclosure and the relevance of 
the information to a defendant’s just deserts. Evidence relevant to a statute of 
limitations or entrapment defense is largely divorced from a defendant’s 
blameworthiness. Evidence of excuses such as duress and insanity is somewhat 
more relevant. Classic justifications such as necessity and self-defense are 
central to blameworthiness and guilt, so the costs of nondisclosure for these 
defenses would be highest, but on the other hand defendants may be likely to 
know the evidence that would help them. 
Unfortunately, the facts in Ruiz did not raise these issues in any concrete 
way. Angela Ruiz was caught red-handed and had no possible defense. It was 
hard to imagine a credible claim of self-defense or insanity bearing on her guilt 
of drug smuggling, so the affirmative-defense waiver was entirely theoretical. 
Perhaps Ruiz inverts the famous maxim and shows how easy cases can make 
bad law. How will Ruiz apply when the withheld evidence is highly relevant to 
the grade of crime or the sentence deserved? 
For several years after Ruiz, the Court did not return to consider these 
issues again in earnest.97 Not until the end of the decade did the Court focus on 
 
96. Id. 
97. The Court touched on them only in passing in 2004 in Blakely. There, Justice Breyer 
worried about how the Court’s jury-trial guarantee for sentencing facts would play out in practice, 
given the prevalence of plea bargaining. Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S. 296, 337–38 (2004) 
(Breyer, J., dissenting) (quoting Bibas, supra note 48, at 1100, 1150-51 & n.330). Writing for the 
majority, Justice Scalia’s originalist opinion simply assumed that bargained-for waivers would 
allow plea bargaining to go on undisturbed. Id. at 310–11 (majority opinion). He evinced sub-
stantial concern for the fairness of indictments and jury trials but little for plea bargaining, because 
any metric of the fairness of plea bargaining “is not the one the Framers left us with.” Id. at 312. 
In 2005, the Court held that defendants who plead guilty need appointed lawyers to help them 
navigate appellate complexities, but did not express a broader appreciation of plea bargaining. 
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how its criminal procedure rules could and should influence the dynamics of 
guilty pleas. 
III. 
PADILLA CONFRONTS THE REAL WORLD OF GUILTY PLEAS 
Until 2010, the Supreme Court had never focused on collateral 
consequences of guilty pleas or defense lawyers’ duty to advise clients about 
them. In Padilla, the Court squarely confronted the issue. Jose Padilla, a 
Honduran and U.S. permanent resident for decades, was charged with felony 
trafficking in marijuana. He asked his lawyer whether pleading guilty would 
expose him to deportation. His lawyer erroneously assured him that he “did not 
have to worry about immigration status since he had been in the country so 
long.”98 That advice was flatly wrong; the drug-trafficking crime qualified as 
an aggravated felony and so triggered automatic deportation under federal 
law.99 Relying on the misadvice, Padilla pleaded guilty. When he learned of the 
lawyer’s mistake, he collaterally attacked his plea in state court, alleging that he 
would have gone to trial but for his lawyer’s mistaken advice.100 The Supreme 
Court held that a lawyer’s failure to advise a noncitizen defendant about 
deportation can violate the Sixth Amendment’s guarantee of effective 
assistance of counsel if it prejudices his decision.101 
This Part analyzes the large shifts in landscape wrought by the Padilla 
tremor, which may develop into an earthquake. Part III.A notes that the Court’s 
frame of reference now treats bargaining as the norm, not the eighteenth-
century jury trial enjoyed by only a few percent of defendants. Part III.B 
considers the Court’s broader definitions of innocence and injustice, which 
incorporate sentencing and other substantive considerations rather than just 
procedural trial rights. Part III.C emphasizes Padilla’s shift in focus away from 
trial judges and juries towards the prosecutors, defense lawyers, and 
rulemaking bodies who bargain or regulate plea bargains. The Court should 
include sentencing commissions within its ken as well. Part III.D praises the 
erosion of the neat analytical compartments that had walled off on-the-record 
from off-the-record proceedings, criminal from civil, direct from collateral 
consequences, and acts from omissions. Part III.E argues that the better 
objections to Padilla are not Justice Scalia’s eighteenth-century formalistic 
ones, but Justice Alito’s twenty-first-century practical concerns. It appraises 
Padilla as the eclipse of Justice Scalia’s formalist originalism, the ascendancy 
of Justices Alito and Sotomayor’s prosecutorial pragmatism, and the parting 
 
Halbert v. Michigan, 545 U.S. 605 (2005). 
 98. Padilla v. Kentucky, 130 S. Ct. 1473, 1477–78 (2010) (internal quotation marks 
omitted). 
 99. 8 U.S.C. §§ 1101(a)(43)(B), 1227(a)(2)(A)(iii), (B)(i) (2006). 
100. Padilla, 130 S. Ct. at 1478. 
101. Id. 
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triumph of Justice Stevens’s common-law incrementalism. The key, open 
question is whether the new prosecutorial pragmatism will sustain its traction 
as Justice Kagan and other new Justices join the Court. 
A. Recognizing Plea Bargaining as the Norm 
One of the most important points in Padilla is not highlighted in the 
Court’s opinion but largely implicit. Justice Stevens’s majority opinion 
mentions only in passing that today, 95 percent of criminal convictions result 
from guilty pleas and only 5 percent result from trials.102 Plea bargaining is no 
longer a negligible exception to the norm of trials; it is the norm. Nor, given 
information deficits and pressures to bargain, can we simply trust in an efficient 
plea market that reflects full information about expected trial outcomes. Thus, 
plea bargaining needs tailored regulation in its own right, not simply a series of 
waivers of trial rights. 
Trials no longer set a fixed, normative baseline. The expected post-trial 
sentence is imposed in only a few percent of cases. It is like the sticker price for 
cars: only an ignorant, ill-advised consumer would view full price as the norm 
and anything less as a bargain. The term plea bargain, then, risks being 
misleading. Mental anchoring need not focus on post-trial baselines.103 In a 
world of bargaining, a much wider range of potential outcomes is on the table. 
Thus, the Court recognizes that a competent defense lawyer “may be able to 
plea bargain creatively with the prosecutor in order to craft a conviction and 
sentence” that suits both sides’ interests.104  
This vision of “creativ[e] . . . craft[ing]”105 radically revises the Court’s 
earlier assumption that trial outcomes were normative. Under the former view, 
any lesser conviction or sentence was an act of grace, largely unregulated 
except to ensure voluntary waivers of sacred trial procedures. Now, the Court 
sees that the law is not fixed but variable. It creates a multifarious spectrum of 
outcomes, both direct and (nominally) collateral, both criminal and civil. A 
single criminal episode often supports multiple charges. Counsel can thus 
charge-bargain down to crimes that may not require deportation in exchange 
for dismissal of charges that do.106 In exchange, defense counsel can offer 
 
102. Id. at 1485, 1486 n.13. 
103. People come up with and evaluate numbers by focusing on a reference point (an 
anchor) and then adjusting up or down from that anchor. This anchor may come, for example, 
from the expected sentence after trial, the initial plea-bargaining offer, the statutory maximum 
sentence, or even a completely random or irrelevant number. Because people usually do not adjust 
away from their anchors enough, their initial choice of anchors has an inordinate effect on their 
final result. See Bibas, supra note 29, at 2515–18. In this context, focusing on the post-trial 
sentence as a baseline will make even a mediocre plea bargain look like a good discount off the 
sticker price. In contrast, focusing on the average plea-bargained result will make a mediocre plea 
bargain look like a bad deal. 
104. Padilla, 130 S. Ct. at 1486. 
105. Id. 
106. Id. 
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restitution, forfeiture, or cooperation with the government against other 
defendants, increasing the size of the pie and splitting the gains from trade. 
Even begging the prosecution or judge to reduce a jail sentence by one day, 
from 365 to 364 days, can make all the difference in avoiding automatic 
deportation.107 Charges and sentences are not exogenously specified by some 
neutral rule, but endogenous to the bargaining process. 
Since Padilla, the Supreme Court has reiterated this understanding of plea 
bargaining as a complex tradeoff of risks. In Premo v. Moore, the Court 
recently rejected a habeas challenge to a defense lawyer’s advice to take a 
quick plea bargain.108 Justice Kennedy’s opinion for the Court rightly stressed 
that “[p]lea bargains are the result of complex negotiations suffused with 
uncertainty, and defense attorneys must make careful strategic choices in 
balancing opportunities and risks.”109 Parties reasonably trade that uncertainty 
for substantial discounts, to purchase finality, even as they know that their and 
the other side’s evidence may wax or wane.110 If courts second-guess these 
bargains in hindsight based on scanty records, prosecutors will have less 
incentive to offer favorable bargains and everyone will lose.111 Thus, the early 
signs are that Padilla was not a one-off decision but may have heralded the 
dawn of a new era. 
B. A Broader Understanding of Injustice 
Related to the baseline of pleas is a broader evaluation of what makes a 
plea just. The Court’s concern now reaches beyond a defendant’s factual guilt 
of a charge to evaluate whether the punishment is fitting. The Court had 
previously taken baby steps in this direction, applying some criminal 
procedures to post-trial capital sentencing.112 Some capital sentencing law 
treated defendants who are factually guilty of the crime as being innocent of 
deserving the death penalty.113 And, in the last decade, the Apprendi line of 
 
107. See, e.g., State v. Quintero Morelos, 137 P.3d 114, 116, 119 (Wash. Ct. App. 2006); 
NORTON TOOBY & JOSEPH ROLLIN, CRIMINAL DEFENSE OF IMMIGRANTS § 10.1 (4th ed. 2007). 
108. 131 S. Ct. 733, 746 (2011). 
109. Id. at 741. 
110. Id. 
111. Id. at 741–42, 745–46.  
112. The Court’s early regulation of sentencing occurred primarily in capital cases, leaving 
it unclear how thoroughly the Court would apply these procedural doctrines to noncapital cases. 
See, e.g., Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 686–87 (1984) (applying effective-assistance-
of-counsel test to capital sentencing proceedings, while leaving open whether the same test would 
apply equally at noncapital sentencing); Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 87–88 (1963) (defining, 
in the context of a capital case, material that prosecutors must disclose to defendants as evidence 
that would tend either to exculpate the defendant or to reduce the penalty). 
113. See, e.g., Sawyer v. Whitley, 505 U.S. 333, 345 (1992) (defining capital defendants as 
“innocent of the death penalty” for purposes of habeas corpus exception wherever they can show 
innocence of the capital crime, or that there was no required aggravating factor, or that another 
requirement for death eligibility had not been met). 
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cases regulated judicial findings of fact that raised sentences.114 But Padilla 
squarely recognized that, to make bargaining just, defendants need information 
to evaluate bargained-for sentences. 
Defendants care about much more than just guilty verdicts and 
convictions. While convictions may be foregone conclusions in many cases, 
where defendants are caught red-handed with no defense, the punishments need 
not be. As noted, defendants face a spectrum of possible outcomes even after 
conviction. Thus, they need to weigh “‘the advantages and disadvantages of a 
plea agreement,’” compared with other possible pleas as well as compared with 
trial.115 The Court has never expressly recognized that a defendant can suffer 
prejudice if his lawyer’s error causes him to strike a worse plea bargain or go to 
trial.116 Some lower courts have rejected the idea, but others have taken that 
logical next step.117 
This understanding of prejudice need not degenerate into endorsing 
gamesmanship and raw partisan advantage. In a market-based plea system, 
defendants need information and the advice of repeat players to get the going 
rate. The going rate amounts to equal treatment, not some unfair advantage 
over others. Once one stops viewing trials as setting the normal and normative 
baseline, one need not denigrate good defense lawyering as thwarting normal, 
just outcomes. While the plea bargaining market is grossly flawed in other 




114. Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 490 (2000). 
115. Padilla v. Kentucky, 130 S. Ct. 1473, 1484 (2010) (quoting Libretti v. United States, 
516 U.S. 29, 50–51 (1995)). See also id. at 1486 (suggesting alternative possible plea bargains). 
116. In formulating its test for when a lawyer’s ineffectiveness prejudices plea bargaining, 
the Court described prejudice as “causing [a defendant] to plead guilty rather than go to trial. . . . 
This assessment, in turn, will depend in large part on a prediction whether the evidence likely 
would have changed the outcome of a trial.” Hill v. Lockhart, 474 U.S. 52, 59 (1985). Though the 
Court did not consider the possibility of two alternative possible plea bargains, its binary framing 
of plea versus trial appeared to foreclose such prejudice claims. See Premo v. Moore, 131 S. Ct. 
733, 743, 745 (2011) (applying Hill’s standard, that an error must have affected a defendant’s 
decision to plead guilty instead of going to trial, to bar a claim that a defense lawyer should have 
obtained a better plea bargain, though Premo arose in the context of deferential review of a state-
court decision on habeas corpus based on what standard was clearly established). Next Term, in 
Lafler v. Cooper and Missouri v. Frye, the Supreme Court will consider whether a defendant can 
be prejudiced by a defense attorney’s error if the error causes him to go to trial. Lafler v. Cooper, 
376 F. App’x 563 (6th Cir. 2010), cert. granted, 131 S. Ct. 856 (U.S. Jan. 7, 2011) (No. 10-209); 
Missouri v. Frye, 311 S.W.3d 350 (Mo. Ct. App. 2010), cert. granted, 131 S. Ct. 856 (U.S. Jan. 7, 
2011) (No. 10-444). 
117. Compare United States v. Springs, 988 F.2d 746, 749 (7th Cir. 1993) (Easterbrook, J.) 
(rejecting the possibility of prejudice), State v. Greuber, 165 P.3d 1185, 1190 (Utah 2007) (same), 
Bryan v. State, 134 S.W.3d 795, 802–04 (Mo. Ct. App. 2004) (same), and State v. Monroe, 757 
So. 2d 895, 898 (La. Ct. App. 2000) (same), with Williams v. Jones, 571 F.3d 1086, 1091–92 
(10th Cir. 2009) (per curiam) (finding prejudice), reh’g denied, 583 F.3d 1254 (10th Cir. 2009), 
and Commonwealth v. Mahar, 809 N.E.2d 989, 993 (Mass. 2004) (same). 
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jobs.118 As long as plea bargaining exists, the solution must be to improve the 
market’s flaws rather than to drive it underground. 
Of course, in the old days and even today in many states, unstructured 
sentencing kept sentences from being controllable or extremely predictable. But 
even in these states, going rates and informal expectations develop among the 
repeat players in the market.119 And with the growth of mandatory minimums, 
sentencing guidelines, and collateral consequences, many defendants and their 
lawyers have even more power to predict and influence outcomes through 
bargaining. As sentencing laws have grown more complex, defendants must 
increasingly rely on their lawyers to navigate options and pull levers that 
greatly affect sentences. Good defense lawyers must know, for example, 
whether a defendant’s small children, ill health, apology, cooperation, or 
restitution can lower his sentence.120 Unfortunately, because not all defense 
lawyers are experienced repeat players, not all are aware of these opportunities. 
Defense lawyers may even misadvise clients about sentencing guidelines and 
the likely sentences they face.121 As a result, some defendants may receive 
higher sentences than others simply because they could not afford to hire better 
lawyers.122 They may be guilty of the crimes, but may not deserve sentences as 
harsh as the ones they receive. Plea-bargaining doctrine should try to guard 
against these charge and sentencing inequities, not just convictions of the 
innocent. Padilla is a step in that direction. 
C. The Roles of Lawyers, Not Just Arbiters 
Related to the nature of the plea-bargaining market is Padilla’s 
appreciation of the actors who run it. In a world of trials, the crucial guarantor 
of fairness would be a full presentation of the evidence to a neutral judge and 
jury. If defendants chose to give up those sacred trial rights, judges’ jobs would 
be to make sure they understood all the procedures that they were forgoing. The 
pre-Padilla plea-bargaining model assumed that judicial oversight of plea 
agreements and the shadows cast by jury trials would regulate the actions of 
both defense and government counsel and hence protect defendants. In other 
 
118. See generally Bibas, supra note 29 (cataloguing the structural forces and 
psychological biases that warp plea bargains, causing them to diverge from expected trial 
outcomes). 
119. See MILTON HEUMANN, PLEA BARGAINING: THE EXPERIENCES OF PROSECUTORS, 
JUDGES, AND DEFENSE ATTORNEYS 90, 120–21 (1977) (finding, in a qualitative empirical study 
before the advent of sentencing guidelines, that defense lawyers develop confidence in their 
ability to predict plea-bargained outcomes and learn to cite prior dispositions to prosecutors, 
establishing going rates for particular crimes). 
120. Bibas, supra note 29, at 2483–84. 
121. See United States v. Barnes, 83 F.3d 934, 939–40 (7th Cir. 1996) (declining to find 
defense lawyer ineffective for mistakenly calculating sentencing guidelines range as 46 to 57 
months, instead of 262 to 327 months, because it was not clear whether the lawyer had failed to 
investigate and appreciate the implications of a past parole revocation). 
122. Bibas, supra note 29, at 2477–86. 
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words, forecasted jury-trial verdicts in theory determined plea-bargained 
results, and judges still supervise plea colloquies as if those waivers of 
procedural rights are the heart of plea-bargain decisions. But Padilla recog-
nized that these institutional actors—juries, judges, and counsel—play different 
roles in real plea bargains. The key to plea bargaining is not the plea colloquy, 
but the bargaining and advice that precede it. Particularly because judges are 
absent from that bargaining, defense lawyers must actively negotiate and 
competently advise their clients on whether a bargain is substantively desirable. 
1. Judges  
With the dearth of jury trials, juries are all but absent from defendants’ 
plea decisions. Judges likewise play far smaller roles in plea bargaining than 
the trial model supposed. Far from actively managing the plea-bargaining 
process, judges are passive and reactive. They can neither investigate nor 
advise about the tactics and merits of pleas. Their job is to recite boilerplate 
plea colloquies to ensure that defendants understand the charges, the direct 
consequences of conviction, and the procedural rights they are waiving.123 
Those colloquies also seek to expose any coercion, threats, misrepresentations, 
or improper promises.124 The federal system and many states forbid judges to 
take part in the bargaining.125 One variety of plea bargain, a stipulated-sentence 
agreement, binds the judge to a particular sentence if the judge accepts the 
agreement.126 Other, nonbinding sentence bargains leave judges free to impose 
different sentences.127 But even for nonbinding bargains, because there has 
been no trial at which they could hear the evidence, judges must depend on the 
parties’ selective presentation of the facts.128 That reactive posture encourages 
judges to rubber-stamp the parties’ recommendations. Judges can, however, 
inquire about whether defense lawyers are doing their jobs. Thus, judges may 
ask whether defendants are satisfied with their lawyers’ representation and 
whether their lawyers have had time to explain the bargains to them. 
 
123. E.g., FED. R. CRIM. P. 11(b). 
124. See id. 
125. See supra note 33. 
126. E.g., FED. R. CRIM. P. 11(c)(1)(C). 
127. E.g., FED. R. CRIM. P. 11(c)(1)(B), (3)(B). 
128. Some systems have probation officers prepare presentence investigation reports to 
provide judges with neutral, more complete information in time for sentencing. The thoroughness 
and independence of these reports is open to question, however, as probation officers may 
themselves depend on the parties for their information. See Benjamin L. Coleman, In Defense of 
Hopper: Raising the Burden of Proof for Dramatic Increases Under the Guidelines, 12 FED. 
SENT’G REP. 225, 226–27 (2000) (reporting author’s personal observation that “it is rare for a 
probation officer to conduct an independent investigation of the offense conduct, such as 
reviewing transcripts, interviewing witnesses, or inspecting a crime scene”); Probation Officers 
Advisory Group Survey, 8 FED. SENT’G REP. 303, 305–06 (1996). 
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2. Defense Counsel  
Against this newly acknowledged backdrop of limited judicial 
involvement, the Padilla Court turned to defense counsel’s role in looking out 
for defendants’ best interests. Justice Scalia’s dissent would have stopped at the 
status quo, suggesting that defense lawyers need offer no more advice than 
judges must offer at plea colloquies.129 But the majority rightly rejected his 
conflation of two distinct roles. Judges can remain detached precisely because 
they can rely on defense counsel to do their jobs. “[I]t is the responsibility of 
defense counsel”—not the court at a plea colloquy—“to inform a defendant of 
the advantages and disadvantages of a plea agreement.”130 Defense lawyers, not 
judges, investigate cases and defendants’ particular circumstances before pleas. 
Defense lawyers, not judges, offer their clients opinions and strategic advice. 
The market system relies on lawyers’ professional sense of the going rates. 
Criminal defendants are often poor and uneducated and may not even speak 
English. They often have poor or erroneous information and rely on experts to 
correct them. The old caveat emptor approach is woefully inadequate for 
defendants navigating the intricacies and inequities of modern plea bargaining. 
As the Court recognized, defendants must not be “left to the ‘mercies of 
incompetent counsel.’”131 
The difference between judges’ and defense counsel’s roles goes hand in 
hand with different doctrinal bases for regulation. The font of early plea-
bargaining regulation was Boykin v. Alabama, which interpreted the Due 
Process Clause to require judges to ensure knowledge, voluntariness, and a 
factual basis for pleas.132 Conversely, Brady v. United States limited judges’ 
due process obligations to ensuring “ful[l] aware[ness] of the direct 
consequences” and the absence of threats, misrepresentations, bribes, and the 
like.133 But the Sixth Amendment’s guarantee of effective assistance of counsel 
is broader, guaranteeing performance “within the range of competence 
demanded of attorneys in criminal cases.”134 It is not just a negative right to be 
 
129. Padilla v. Kentucky, 130 S. Ct. 1473, 1496 n.1 (2010) (Scalia, J., dissenting). See also 
Transcript of Oral Argument at 16, Padilla v. Kentucky, 130 S. Ct. 1473 (2010) (No. 08-651) 
(question by Justice Scalia). While Justice Scalia did not decide the point, he implied that neither 
defense lawyers nor judges must advise about collateral consequences to ensure that pleas are 
knowing and voluntary. Padilla, 130 S. Ct. at 1496 n.1 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (quoting authorities 
for the propositions that “awareness of ‘direct consequences’ suffices for the validity of a guilty 
plea” and that Rule 11 colloquies, which “d[o] not mention collateral consequences,” 
“approximate[] the due process requirements for a valid plea”).  
130. Libretti v. United States, 516 U.S. 29, 50 (1995). 
131. Padilla, 130 S. Ct. at 1486 (majority opinion) (quoting McMann v. Richardson, 397 
U.S. 759, 771 (1970)). 
132. 395 U.S. 238, 243 (1969). 
133. 397 U.S. 742, 755 (1970) (quoting Shelton v. United States, 246 F.2d 571, 572 n.2 
(5th Cir. 1957) (en banc), rev’d on other grounds, 356 U.S. 26 (1958) (per curiam)). 
134. McMann v. Richardson, 397 U.S. 759, 770–71 (1970). See also Hill v. Lockhart, 474 
U.S. 52, 56–59 (1985) (quoting this language from McMann and applying it to guilty-plea 
context). 
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free of threats, lies, and bribes, but a broad positive right to effective assistance 
whenever the state seeks to imprison a criminal defendant. The Court’s 
touchstone formulation of the content of the right to effective assistance, 
Strickland v. Washington, requires not a fixed set of actions, but “simply 
reasonableness under prevailing professional norms.”135 
The role of prevailing professional norms for defense counsel is a key 
difference between Strickland and Rule 11 (and analogous state rules). While 
Strickland does not mechanically copy American Bar Association (ABA) 
standards, it looks to them as guideposts for determining reasonableness.136 So, 
unlike the static set of procedures imposed top-down by Rule 11, Strickland’s 
standards are dynamic and bottom-up. The law responds and evolves in light of 
the bar’s expectations and accumulated wisdom over time. This is an incremen-
tal, common-law, Burkean approach to change, quite unlike formalistic bright-
line rules that freeze clear procedures in place. Thus, Padilla stressed that 
whether an attorney’s performance was deficient was “necessarily linked to the 
practice and expectations of the legal community.”137 Those practices and 
expectations have evolved in response to changes in immigration law that made 
deportation a far more common and automatic consequence of criminal convic-
tions.138 The Court looked to bar publications, criminal defense organizations, 
treatises, and scholars to confirm that its rule reflected prevailing norms.139 
Thus, the Court limited its ruling to the context of deportation, leaving for 
another day whether other so-called collateral consequences might merit 
similar treatment.140 In a later case, the Court can consider the prevailing norms 
and practical considerations governing loss of child custody, for example. 
This dynamic understanding of prevailing professional norms 
accommodates the important roles of resource allocation and discretion. 
Defense lawyers often must juggle many cases and lack the resources to litigate 
every aspect of every case exhaustively. They must perform triage, and 
prevailing norms guide them in exercising their discretion to allocate resources 
while still representing their clients zealously. Now that the bar recognizes the 
importance of deportation to many clients, bar organizations have developed 
training materials and guides for criminal defense lawyers.141 In allocating their 
limited time and resources, lawyers need incentives to exercise their discretion 
 
135. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 688 (1984). 
136. Id. 
137. Padilla v. Kentucky, 130 S. Ct. 1473, 1482 (2010). See also Transcript of Oral 
Argument at 26–28, Padilla v. Kentucky, 130 S. Ct. 1473 (2010) (No. 08-651) (questions by 
Breyer, J.) (stressing that Strickland’s reliance on “prevailing professional norms” defies reduction 
to a simple rule forbidding misadvice or permitting nonadvice). 
138. See Padilla, 130 S. Ct. at 1480, 1482–83 (noting recent changes in immigration law 
that have made deportation an automatic consequence and citing an array of recent publications 
instructing defense lawyers to advise their clients about that risk). 
139. Id. at 1482–83. 
140. Id. at 1481–82. 
141. Id. at 1482–83; see also Roberts, supra note 68, at 147–48. 
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properly. The Court declined to limit its rule to misadvice because permitting 
nonadvice would have “encouraged [lawyers] to say nothing at all.”142 Since 
information about deportation is crucial for many defendants and often easily 
available, defense lawyers ought to provide it.143 
Though Padilla did not cite it, its development of ineffective-assistance 
standards for pleas mirrors its recent ineffective-assistance standards for capital 
sentencing. For many years, Strickland appeared to be toothless, requiring little 
of defense counsel.144 But over the last decade, the Court has looked to ABA 
standards to require capital defenders to investigate mitigating evidence for 
sentencing.145 Defense lawyers have little excuse for not even investigating 
mitigating evidence, while the defendant’s need for mitigating evidence to 
ensure a just sentence is enormous. Likewise, they cannot simply avoid 
mentioning deportation, let alone misadvise about it, because it “may be more 
important to the client than any potential jail sentence.”146 
3. Prosecutors 
While defense lawyers were the central actors in the Padilla drama, 
prosecutors play important roles as well. As the former head of the National 
District Attorneys Association wrote, prosecutors “must consider [collateral 
consequences] if we are to see that justice is done.”147 “How can we ignore a 
consequence of our prosecution that we know will surely be imposed by the 
operation of law?”148 Prosecutors must consider that collateral consequences 
make victims less likely to press charges, defendants less likely to plead guilty, 
and judges more likely to lower charges and sentences.149 As Padilla astutely 
noted, prosecutors can choose to offer creative plea bargains that avoid 
deportation, giving defendants powerful incentives to plead guilty. More 
informed bargaining can thus benefit prosecutors as well as defendants.150 
Prosecutors also have incentives to ensure that defendants get accurate 
 
142. Padilla, 130 S. Ct. at 1484. 
143. Id. 
144. See, e.g., Stephen B. Bright, Counsel for the Poor: The Death Sentence Not for the 
Worst Crime but for the Worst Lawyer, 103 YALE L.J. 1835, 1857–65 (1994); Richard Klein, The 
Emperor Gideon Has No Clothes: The Empty Promise of the Constitutional Right to Effective 
Assistance of Counsel, 13 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 625, 640–45 (1986). 
145. Rompilla v. Beard, 545 U.S. 374, 387 (2005); Wiggins v. Smith, 539 U.S. 510, 524 
(2003); Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 396 (2000). See generally John H. Blume & Stacey D. 
Neumann, “It’s Like Déjà Vu All Over Again”: Williams v. Taylor, Wiggins v. Smith, Rompilla 
v. Beard and a (Partial) Return to the Guidelines Approach to the Effective Assistance of Counsel, 
34 AM. J. CRIM. L. 127 (2007). 
146. Padilla, 130 S. Ct. at 1483 (quoting INS v. St. Cyr, 533 U.S. 289, 323 (2001)). 




150. Padilla, 130 S. Ct. at 1486. 
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information about deportation to bulletproof their convictions.151 The Court’s 
new appreciation of prosecutorial discretion in bargaining is welcome. 
The Court also showed an appreciation for how other bodies can help to 
inform bargaining. One possibility is that rules advisory committees could 
amend the rules of criminal procedure. At oral argument in Padilla, Justice 
Kennedy repeatedly asked whether Rule 11 ought to be amended to warn 
defendants about the possibility of deportation.152 The Court’s opinion noted 
that almost half of states, by statute or rule, already warn defendants about 
possible immigration consequences.153 But counsel argued, and the Court 
appeared to agree, that while a generic warning at a plea colloquy may be 
salutary, it is no substitute for counsel’s particularized advice.154 Other bodies, 
such as sentencing commissions, can likewise play a role in tailoring and 
updating the law, though Padilla did not involve nor address these issues. 
D. The Erosion of Neat Dichotomies and Bright Lines 
Padilla also recognized that modern criminal practice does not fit within 
neat boxes. Important stages of criminal cases include not just trials, but also 
investigation, negotiation, and advice. Many key events happen off the record, 
and at oral argument Chief Justice Roberts and Justice Alito worried that 
Padilla claims would require evidentiary hearings.155 Off-the-record events 
likewise matter to other kinds of ineffective assistance claims, such as failure to 
investigate mitigating evidence. Yet that difficulty has not prevented the Court 
from applying Strickland to review those failures.156 If anything, judicial 
scrutiny is all the more necessary precisely because proceedings are hidden and  
 
off the record. Otherwise, lawyers may be tempted to cut corners and push 
 
151. Though the Court did not note it, prosecutors have several other tools that they can use 
to inform defendants and encourage plea bargains. They can detail the advantages and penalties 
for defendants in their written plea agreements and at plea colloquies. Even when defendants 
decide to plead guilty without an agreement, prosecutors can write letters detailing their 
sentencing guidelines calculations and could just as easily detail collateral consequences. Cf. 
United States v. Pimentel, 932 F.2d 1029, 1034 (2d Cir. 1991) (encouraging but not requiring 
prosecutors to inform defendants of their likely sentencing guidelines calculations). And 
prosecutors can conduct face-to-face reverse proffer sessions with defendants, detailing the 
strength of the prosecution’s case and the benefits of a guilty plea. Bibas, supra note 29, at 2525. 
152. Transcript of Oral Argument at 8, 13, 31, Padilla v. Kentucky, 130 S. Ct. 1473 (2010) 
(No. 08-651) (questions of Kennedy, J.). 
153. Padilla, 130 S. Ct. at 1486 n.15. 
154. See Transcript of Oral Argument at 8, 31, Padilla v. Kentucky, 130 S. Ct. 1473 (2010) 
(No. 08-651) (distinguishing courts’ Rule 11 warnings from lawyers’ Sixth Amendment duties to 
advise). 
155. Id. at 10–11, 18–19 (implying concern over the resource burden that such hearings 
would place on the criminal justice system, and expressly noting the problems of fading memories 
and competing accounts of off-the-record proceedings). 
156. See supra text accompanying note 145 (noting the Court’s increased scrutiny over the 
past decade of capital defense lawyers’ failures to investigate mitigating evidence relevant to 
sentencing). 
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clients to plead guilty quickly.157 
The Court did not let floodgate fears dictate a narrow ruling. Instead, it 
noted that Strickland’s bar is high and that no flood of claims had erupted after 
Hill v. Lockhart extended Strickland to plea bargaining.158 To win, convicts 
must show that rejecting the plea bargain would have been rational.159 Lower 
courts are experienced at sifting meritorious from specious claims. And 
experience confirms that defendants who plead guilty are much less likely to 
challenge their convictions, as they would lose the benefits of their bargains 
and risk worse outcomes.160 The Court’s holding reflected this accumulated 
experience, rather than a bright-line rule closing the courthouse doors. 
Padilla also poked a large hole in the wall between criminal and civil 
proceedings, and that hole may lead the wall to crumble or collapse. Criminal 
defense lawyers are appointed to represent defendants in their criminal cases, 
not in all of their problems in life. But increasingly, criminal and civil law are 
intertwined and shade into one another. Clients depend on lawyers to advise 
them, and their advice within criminal cases must reflect various tradeoffs 
and consequences. Civil consequences may be predictable or even automatic; 
plea decisions within criminal cases can trigger large civil consequences. 
Criminal defense lawyers must look ahead to clear immigration issues, just as 
mergers and acquisitions lawyers cannot ignore obvious tax, antitrust, or 
regulatory implications of their deals. The Sixth Amendment test should be 
not whether a consequence is labeled civil or collateral, but whether it is 
severe enough and certain enough to be a significant factor in criminal 
defendants’ bargaining calculus.  
Taking an apparently incremental approach, Padilla did not decide 
whether to disavow the entire collateral-consequences doctrine that lower 
courts had developed. It specifically limited its holding to deportation because 
it is intertwined with the criminal process and hence nearly impossible to 
classify as direct or collateral.161 But it relied on the ABA’s evolved 
professional norms, which require advice at least about deportation.162 Future 
cases may extend Padilla’s reasoning to demolish the collateral-consequences 
doctrine more generally, focusing on the importance of particular consequences 
rather than their criminal or civil labels. The bar no longer rigidly separates the 
two fields, and neither does the Court. 
Finally, the Court in Padilla did not differentiate between acts and 
 
157. See Bibas, supra note 29, at 2475–76; Stephen J. Schulhofer, Criminal Justice 
Discretion as a Regulatory System, 17 J. LEGAL STUD. 43, 58–59 (1988) (noting how much worse 
agency-cost problems are in plea bargaining because of its low visibility and lack of reputational 
sanctions for poor performance). 
158. Hill v. Lockhart, 474 U.S. 52 (1985); Padilla, 130 S. Ct. at 1484–85. 
159. Padilla, 130 S. Ct. at 1485. 
160. Id. at 1485–86. 
161. Id. at 1481–82. 
162. Id. at 1482–84. 
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omissions; it forbade nonadvice as well as misadvice.163 The Sixth Amendment 
guarantees not just freedom from state interference, but state-supplied 
competent counsel.164 The state cannot imprison defendants without first 
providing them with effective defense advocates. Strickland regulates both acts 
and omissions.165 It gives defendants an affirmative right to information and 
tactical advice so that they can make informed choices whether to plead 
guilty.166 But a rule limited to affirmative misadvice would perversely 
encourage defense lawyers to say nothing at all to avoid allegations of 
ineffectiveness.167 Since we now live in a world where almost every right is 
waivable, courts must police the standards for waiver and ensure good advice. 
E. The Failure of Formalism and the Rise of Realism 
The notable loser in this exchange was Justice Scalia and his brand of 
formalist originalism. His dissent, joined by Justice Thomas, reprised his 
Blakely and Crawford majority opinions, criticizing judicial construction of the 
Constitution to solve contemporary problems.168 The Sixth Amendment, he 
noted, originally was a negative right to hire counsel, which the Court had 
extended into a positive right to effective counsel at government expense. He 
thus implicitly questioned whether even Gideon and Strickland were right.169 
Assuming arguendo that they were, he noted that the Sixth Amendment’s text 
limits it to criminal prosecutions, not broader civil ramifications.170 And he 
resisted the majority’s use of professional standards to shape constitutional 
requirements for effective assistance.171 In other words, he would have 
confined the Sixth Amendment to the issues implicated in founding-era 
criminal trials. That approach would have neatly separated criminal from civil, 
negative from positive, and professional from legal standards. Plea bargaining 
would have been unregulated, left to caveat emptor and the flawed market 
(even though plea bargaining did not exist in the eighteenth century). 
As I have argued elsewhere, Justice Scalia’s originalist arguments often 
seem at root to be driven by formalism rather than the other way around.172 At 
 
163. Id. at 1484 (determining “that there is no relevant difference between an act of 
commission and an act of omission in this context” (internal quotation marks omitted)). 
164. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 685–86 (1984); Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 
U.S. 335, 344 (1963). 
165. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 690.  
166. See Libretti v. United States, 516 U.S. 29, 50–51 (1995). 
167. Padilla, 130 S. Ct. at 1484. 
168. Id. at 1494 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (ridiculing the majority for turning “[t]he 
Constitution . . . [into] an all-purpose tool for judicial construction of a perfect world” and noting 
that we do not live “[i]n the best of all possible worlds”). 
169. Id. at 1495 (citing Strickland, 466 U.S. at 686, and Gideon, 372 U.S. at 344–45). 
170. Id. 
171. Id. 
172. See Bibas, supra note 16, at 201–03 (offering this explanation for the Apprendi-
Blakely line of cases). 
05 Bibas.doc (Do Not Delete) 7/5/2011  8:47 PM 
2011] REGULATING THE PLEA-BARGAINING MARKET 1149 
the bottom of Justice Scalia’s argument was his fear of the slippery slope, of 
opening Pandora’s box. The majority’s argument had “no logical stopping-
point” and would lead to “years of elaboration” based on nothing but “judicial 
caprice.”173 But a rule that depends on and follows an evolved consensus of the 
bar is hardly arbitrary policymaking. Justice Stevens’s approach is an 
incremental one familiar to the common law. It considered the lived experience 
of bar norms and state legislation and procedures before reaching out to solidify 
them into a rule.174 It will indeed require future elaboration. But that temporary 
uncertainty is a cost worth bearing to protect the 95 percent of defendants who 
rely on their lawyers’ advice when pleading guilty. 
The more powerful counterarguments against the Padilla majority were 
not formalist or originalist but pragmatist, exemplified by Justice Alito’s 
concurrence in the judgment, joined by Chief Justice Roberts.175 At oral 
argument, Justice Alito surprised this author by expressing some sympathy for 
Padilla’s plight. At the same time, he worried about the difficulties of 
reconstructing attorneys’ advice and disproving misadvice claims at evidentiary 
hearings years later.176 And he asked whether the Court could classify the types 
of consequences that call for advice and those that do not.177 
Justice Alito rejected Justice Scalia’s approach of caveat emptor. His 
opinion drew Justice Scalia’s ire for recognizing that the Sixth Amendment 
forbids misadvice and requires at least very general warnings about 
deportation.178 That approach, like the majority’s, is not a bright line and would 
have required elaboration. His concerns were intensely practical ones about 
criminal defense attorneys’ limited expertise.179 Immigration law is complex, 
and bar publications themselves note that “nothing is ever simple with 
immigration law.”180 In other words, Justice Alito accepted the majority’s 
pragmatic frame of reference and the importance of the bar’s accumulated 
wisdom, but disputed its conclusion on its own terms. 
Justice Alito further contended that the majority’s rule headed off statutes, 
plea forms, and procedural rules that had been developing more flexible 
solutions in many states. The majority’s new rule risks upsetting many criminal 
convictions, he objected, whereas nonconstitutional solutions would not be as 
 
173. Padilla, 130 S. Ct. at 1496 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
174. Padilla, 130 S. Ct. at 1482-83. 
175. Because Chief Justice Roberts did not write separately and did not say much at oral 
argument, one cannot know why he joined Justice Alito’s pragmatic concurrence. It is possible 
that his joining exemplifies how Justice Alito’s prosecutorial perspective is influencing his 
colleagues, but that is sheer speculation—it is impossible to tell. 
176. Transcript of Oral Argument at 10, Padilla v. Kentucky, 130 S. Ct. 1473 (2010) (No. 
08-651) (questions of Alito, J.). 
177. Id. at 54 (questions of Alito, J.). 
178. Padilla, 130 S. Ct. at 1496 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
179. Id. at 1487–91 (Alito, J., concurring in the judgment). 
180. Id. at 1490. 
Regulating the Plea-Bargaining Market (Do Not Delete) 7/5/2011  8:47 PM 
1150 CALIFORNIA LAW REVIEW [Vol.  99:1117 
disruptive.181 No federal court of appeals had gone as far as the majority, so the 
Court should hesitate to venture that far, whereas lower courts are quite used to 
reviewing claims of misadvice.182 
Finally, Justice Alito did not limit his frame of reference to jury trials. In 
recognizing that the Sixth Amendment forbids misadvice, he rightly worried 
that “incompetent advice distorts the defendant’s decision-making process.”183 
If misadvice skews the contracting process, “the defendant can[not] fairly be 
said to assume the risk . . . [of] indirect consequences of which he or she is not 
aware.”184 Even absent misadvice, Justice Alito would have required general 
deportation warnings and express disclaimers, so defendants would know to 
consult with immigration lawyers.185 In other words, Justice Alito evinced 
concern for informing and regulating the contracting process well before trial. 
His reasoning contained the seeds of important consumer protections, including 
disclaimers and warnings. 
In short, Justice Alito’s approach was intensely pragmatic. It did not seek 
refuge in bright lines, textual exegesis, or eighteenth-century visions of jury 
procedures. It grappled seriously with the bar’s expertise and norms. It 
reflected upon the practical problems of delving into immigration law and 
disrupting convictions. It also heeded the unfairness of making defendants 
decide in the dark. Though he is often lumped together politically with Justice 
Scalia and was even derided as “Scalito,” Justice Alito’s concurrence differs 
greatly from Justice Scalia’s dissent in tone, focus, and outcome.186 His realism 
befits his experience as a federal prosecutor, just as Justice Scalia’s bright-line 
formalism reflects his scholarly bent as a former academic. 
Though the evidence is hazier, the other former prosecutor on the Court 
may likewise be showing her realistic streak. The first three questions to 
respondent’s counsel were posed by Justice Sotomayor.187 She emphasized that 
a guilty plea is not just a factual statement of guilt, but a conscious, strategic 
decision to sacrifice rights.188 That choice among risky alternatives must be 
informed, particularly when a defendant signals that he cares about deportation 
and asks for advice. Though she did not write separately, the majority opinion  
 
 
181. Id. at 1491. Justice Scalia’s opinion also nodded towards these concerns about 
experimentation and alternatives. But he tacked them on briefly at the end, almost as an 
afterthought, rather than making them the heart of his dissent. Id. at 1496–97 (Scalia, J., 
dissenting). 
182. Id. at 1491–94 (Alito, J., concurring in the judgment). 
183. Id. at 1493. 
184. Id. 
185. Id. at 1494. 
186. See Ann Althouse, Op-Ed., Separated at the Bench, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 1, 2005, at A27 
(questioning the common, condescending conflation of the two jurists by the use of this epithet). 
187. Transcript of Oral Argument at 35–37, Padilla v. Kentucky, 130 S. Ct. 1473 (2010) 
(No. 08-651) (questions of Sotomayor, J.). 
188. Id. 
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accords with her realism about how and why defendants plead guilty and may 
reflect her influence. 
In the end, the two ex-prosecutors on the Court reached different 
conclusions, but their shared vocabulary and competing concerns framed the 
debate.189 The needs and norms of the twenty-first century, not the neat boxes 
of the eighteenth, define Padilla. That is quite a turnaround from seven years 
ago, when Justice Scalia’s formalist originalism seemed to triumph in 
Crawford and Blakely.  
Now, it remains to be seen whether the Court will persist in this nascent 
trend; one swallow does not a spring make, nor one fine day.190 Padilla could 
turn into a jurisprudential dead end, an outlier limited to its egregious facts. 
Particularly with the departure of Justice Stevens, the author of the majority 
opinion in Padilla, one cannot know whether the Court will persist in this 
direction.191 Justice Kagan, for example, has yet to show her hand or her 
methodology in deciding criminal cases. But one may dare to hope that the 
bright-line rule of caveat emptor is in retreat, and that the project of consumer 
regulation and tactical guidance has begun. 
IV. 
CONSUMER REGULATION OF PLEA BARGAINING 
A solid majority of the Court has thus begun to soften caveat emptor. 
Instead, it recognizes that defendants need protections to ensure that their pleas 
reflect accurate information and competent tactical advice. The Court’s past 
constitutional rulings on plea bargaining have prompted nonconstitutional 
reforms building on their base. For example, after the Court expressly approved 
of plea bargaining, Rule 11 required judges to elicit plea bargains and put them 
on the record.192 And while Boykin required mentioning only three 
constitutional rights at plea colloquies, Rule 11 has codified and expanded 
 
189. That tentative assessment may become clearer in future cases if, for example, the 
Court confronts the buying of cooperator testimony in exchange for leniency. One could imagine 
Justices Alito and Sotomayor debating the need to crack the mob’s code of silence versus the 
proven risk of false testimony. A recent petition for certiorari was a missed opportunity for just 
such a debate: it asked the Supreme Court to consider the constitutionality of cooperation 
agreements that require cooperating witnesses to testify consistently with their prior statements in 
order to earn leniency. Petition for Writ of Certiorari at i, Bannister v. Illinois, No. 09-1576, cert. 
denied, 131 S. Ct. 638 (2010). 
190. ARISTOTLE, NICOMACHEAN ETHICS 17 (F.H. Peters trans., C. Kegan Paul & Co. 
1881) (“If one swallow or one fine day does not make a spring, neither does one day or any small 
space of time make a blessed or happy man.”). English translations often substitute “summer” for 
the original “spring” in this proverb. 
191. But see supra note 117 and text accompanying notes 108–09 (discussing Premo v. 
Moore as a partial continuation of Padilla’s plea-bargaining realism). 
192. FED. R. CRIM. P. 11 & Advisory Committee Note (1974) (citing Brady and 
Santobello’s approval of plea bargaining as justification for bringing plea bargains out into the open 
and regulating them in new subsection (e), which has since been renumbered as (c)); Brady v. 
United States, 397 U.S. 742, 752–53 (1970); Santobello v. New York, 404 U.S. 257, 260 (1971). 
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Boykin’s advisories. Today, it prescribes many more advisories.193 Rule 11 now 
requires warnings and waivers of procedural rights, as well as a minimal factual 
basis for pleas.194 
Rule 11 is a form of consumer regulation, but it is limited and ineffective. It 
emphasizes the waived procedures of theoretical trials, not the pros and cons of 
various substantive plea outcomes. What defendants need is more robust 
consumer protection, much like the laws that regulate consumer contracts. The 
Constitution requires only one layer of protection, but Padilla pours a foundation 
that should prompt legislatures and rules committees to build more layers. 
Indeed, developing flexible nonconstitutional responses might obviate 
further constitutional reforms. That would invert Justice Alito’s fears about 
constitutionalizing this area and stifling development. Better information and 
tactical advice could head off the need to ban certain deals substantively, for 
instance. Perhaps, then, Justice Alito should be especially supportive of 
reforming the rules to address the problem he acknowledges. The Justices have 
the power to do so. The Supreme Court, in its rulemaking capacity, 
promulgates the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, which many states copy 
in large part.195 It bases the rules on the draft proposed by an advisory 
committee, which seeks to reflect the wisdom of leading judges, lawyers, and 
professors.196 Even now, the Criminal Rules Advisory Committee is consi-
dering whether to propose amending Rule 11 in light of Padilla.197 By pursuing 
nonconstitutional consumer protections, the Court can complete the work of its 
Padilla decision, experimenting without freezing one approach in place.  
The remainder of this Part maps the contours of possible reforms. First, 
Part IV.A considers the kinds of plea-bargaining protections that might 
counteract chronic misunderstandings and irrationality. Then, Part IV.B 
touches briefly on what roles various institutional actors ought to play in 
implementing these reforms. 
 
193. Compare Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U.S. 238, 243 (1969) (requiring affirmative waiver 
on the record of the privilege against self-incrimination and the rights to jury trial and to confront 
one’s accusers), with FED. R. CRIM. P. 11(b)(1) (requiring warnings not only about the three rights 
required by Boykin but also about the rights to plead not guilty, testify, counsel, and compulsory 
process, as well as the danger of prosecution for perjury, the existence of any appeal waiver, the 
various penalties, and the existence of sentencing guidelines). See generally supra text 
accompanying note 30 (discussing Boykin and Rule 11’s requirements). 
194. FED. R. CRIM. P. 11(b). Likewise, the discovery obligations of Rule 16 and the Jencks 
Act go well beyond Brady v. Maryland’s constitutional minimum. Compare 18 U.S.C. § 3500 
(2006) (requiring disclosure of witnesses’ prior statements at trial), and FED. R. CRIM. P. 16 
(requiring a series of disclosures of inculpatory evidence upon request of the defendant), with 
Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 87 (1963) (recognizing defendant’s due process right to 
disclosure of exculpatory evidence that is material to guilt or punishment). 
195. Rules Enabling Act, 28 U.S.C. § 2072(a) (2006). 
196. See id. § 2073(a)(2), (b). 
197. Conversation with Nancy J. King, Reporter, Advisory Committee on the Federal 
Rules of Criminal Procedure (Sept. 23, 2010). 
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A. The Content and Format of Plea Protections 
In much of Europe, consumer regulation specifies or forbids a wide 
variety of substantive terms.198 In the United States, substantive consumer 
regulation is limited. Far more prominent is a series of procedural regulations 
designed to ensure that consumers understand and consider carefully the most 
important terms of their bargains. So, for example, the Truth in Lending Act 
requires clear, standardized disclosures of annual percentage rates (APRs), 
finance charges, fees, grace periods, and treatment of credit balances.199 The 
Magnuson-Moss Warranty Act requires clear, simple disclosures of warranties 
to shoppers before purchases.200 The Uniform Commercial Code requires 
disclaimers of certain implied warranties to be conspicuous. It also specifies 
phrases such as “as is” or “with all faults” that suffice to disclaim implied 
warranties.201 Federal Trade Commission (FTC) regulations guarantee consu-
mers a three-day cooling-off period to rescind purchases made from door-to-
door salesmen.202 And various deceptive trade practices acts regulate mislead-
ing or high-pressure sales tactics.203 These disclosure rules have not abolished 
deception and misunderstanding, but surely they are better than nothing. 
It is astonishing that a $100 credit-card purchase of a microwave oven is 
regulated more carefully than a guilty plea that results in years of 
imprisonment. It would not take much to extend the consumer protection 
analogy to plea bargains. Legislatures and rules commissions could forbid 
some terms outright. Mostly, however, they would regulate the contracting 
process procedurally to ensure a modicum of understanding and advice. 
Many cognitive deficits plague plea bargaining and merit fixing. Probably 
the most basic is sheer incomprehension because defendants often are 
unsophisticated laymen facing repeat-player prosecutors. Many defendants also 
feel pressured to make hurried decisions based on advice by lawyers whom 
they may not yet have come to trust. Defense lawyers are often overburdened, 
of varying ability and experience, and may have incentives to plead cases out 
quickly. Framing, anchoring, and loss aversion are also factors. Overconfidence 
and impulsivity probably play lesser roles because impulsive, overconfident 
 
198. See, e.g., Unfair Contract Terms Act, 1977, c. 50 (U.K.); Council Directive 93/13, On 
Unfair Terms in Consumer Contracts, 1993 O.J. (L 95) 29 (EC). 
199. Truth in Lending Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1601–1614 (2006). Regulation Z, implementing 
the statute, is codified at 12 C.F.R. § 226 (2011). 
200. Magnuson-Moss Warranty Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 2301–2312 (2006). The Federal Trade 
Commission’s regulations implementing the act are codified at 16 C.F.R. § 700 (2011). 
201. U.C.C. § 2-316(2), (3) (2007) (specifying rules for disclaimers of implied warranties 
in general and for implied warranties of merchantability or fitness for a particular purpose in 
particular). 
202. 16 C.F.R. § 429.1 (2011). 
203. E.g., REVISED UNIF. DECEPTIVE TRADE PRACTICES ACT (1966); Federal Trade 
Commission Act of 1914, 15 U.S.C. § 57a (2006) (authorizing the FTC to make rules forbidding 
unfair or deceptive acts or practices). 
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defendants are more likely to go to trial or hold out for better deals.204 Solutions 
should attack each of these problems, especially poor defense lawyering and 
incomprehension, followed by excessive pressure to plead quickly. The 
following list is not meant to be a comprehensive blueprint for legislation, but 
rather an effort to brainstorm about possible solutions. 
Improving Comprehension. The most basic and important reforms focus 
on ensuring that defendants know what they are doing. Most critically, they 
need better defense lawyers, as I will discuss, and simpler, clearer plea 
bargains.205 But for starters, all plea agreements should be in writing. While 
many plea bargains are written down, not all are.206 Their terms may be set 
forth at the plea hearing in full, in part, or not at all. Simply memorializing all 
agreements in writing, ahead of time, would go a long way toward reducing 
confusion and later evidentiary disputes about what was promised or 
understood. A simple check-the-box form with blanks for the defendant’s 
name, the charge(s), and the sentence might suffice for simple misdemeanors 
and the like. 
Another comprehension problem is that innumeracy hinders defendants’ 
grasp of the risks of various outcomes, such as the chance of various 
convictions or sentences after trial. Following standard best practices for 
translating numbers into common-sense terms can help. Psychological research 
shows that displaying numerical information visually, and phrasing risks in 
absolute rather than relative terms, help people to understand risks better. It is 
also important to use standard numerical formats and to reduce the number of 
calculations and inferences that readers must make.207 For example, lawyers 
and plea agreements could phrase sentencing ranges not as 126 to 144 months 
but as 10 ½ to 12 years. A bar graph could then show how that range stacks up 
alongside the likely sentencing range after trial, based on recent post-trial 
sentences in similar cases in that jurisdiction. Worksheets could also disclose  
 
 
204. For discussions of how these cognitive biases and heuristics warp plea bargaining, see 
generally Bibas, supra note 29, at 2496–2527. 
205. Of course, simplicity competes at least somewhat with thoroughness. Pleas should 
ideally cover all the important consequences a defendant will likely face, without injecting a 
distracting mound of trivial considerations. That balancing requires judgment calls trading off 
simplicity against thoroughness. The touchstone should be the accumulated experience of the 
bench, bar, and academy about which terms matter most to defendants in practice and how best to 
express them simply and clearly. 
206. E.g., Ex parte Yarber, 437 So. 2d 1330, 1336 (Ala. 1983) (“We are unaware of any 
requirement that the [plea] agreement be reduced to writing.”); State v. Thrift, 440 S.E.2d 341, 
348 (S.C. 1994) (holding that “oral [plea] agreements are perfectly enforceable”). 
207. See, e.g., Hannah Faye Chua et al., Risk Avoidance: Graphs Versus Numbers, 34 
MEMORY & COGNITION 399, 407 (2006); Ellen Peters et al., Numeracy Skill and the 
Communication, Comprehension, and Use of Risk-Benefit Information, 26 HEALTH AFF. 741, 
744–46 (2007); Isaac M. Lipkus & J. G. Hollands, The Visual Communication of Risk, 25 J. 
NAT’L CANCER INST. MONOGRAPHS 149, 159–160 (1999); Paul Slovic et al., Affect, Risk, and 
Decision Making, 24 HEALTH PSYCHOL. S35, S37–S38 (2006). 
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parole eligibility and similar standard terms. Computerized fill-in forms could 
ensure correct calculations tied to the crimes of conviction. 
Clear numbers should be accompanied by clear language. To improve 
defendants’ comprehension, drafting commissions could require summaries of 
agreements in plain English. Studies consistently show that laymen understand 
very little of the boilerplate legalese in jury instructions and the like. Rewriting 
legalese in simpler, shorter terms using the active voice increases readers’ 
understanding markedly.208 The American Law Institute or the Uniform Law 
Commission could draft legible disclosure forms in plain English, similar to the 
standard boxes and tables disclosing credit-card rates, grace periods, billing 
cycles, and fees. They could include reasonable standard terms as defaults. 
Prosecutors would remain free to bargain for nonstandard terms, but those 
could face closer scrutiny and regulation. For example, prosecutors sometimes 
ask one defendant to plead guilty in exchange for lenient treatment of a close 
relative, but these terms are often criticized as coercive.209 For such package 
deals, prosecutors might have to display the provisions in large, boldfaced type, 
specifically discuss them at plea colloquies, and have defendants initial those 
paragraphs individually.210 That would both improve defendants’ understanding 
and perhaps offset one of the most coercive pressures to plead. 
Moderating Pressures. Defendants often face great pressure to plead out 
quickly, which may lead them to make life-altering decisions before they come 
to appreciate the consequences. One way to reduce this pressure would be a 
cooling-off period for plea bargains authorizing five years’ imprisonment or 
more.211 The law could forbid guilty pleas at the initial appearance for serious 
felonies, to avoid pressure to plead immediately after first meeting with one’s 
defense lawyer. It could also require prosecutors to disclose the deal’s terms 
and defense lawyers to offer advice at least three days before the plea hearing, 
unless the court finds compelling reasons to allow an immediate plea. (The 
 
208. See Amiram Elwork et al., Toward Understandable Jury Instructions, 65 JUDICATURE 
432, 434–39 (1982); Robert F. Forston, Sense and Non-Sense: Jury Trial Communication, 1975 
B.Y.U. L. REV. 601, 606, 614–18; Walter W. Steele, Jr. & Elizabeth G. Thornburg, Jury 
Instructions: A Persistent Failure to Communicate, 67 N.C. L. REV. 77, 79–93 (1988) 
(summarizing empirical studies); David U. Strawn & Raymond W. Buchanan, Jury Confusion: A 
Threat to Justice, 59 JUDICATURE 478, 480–83 (1976). 
209. See, e.g., People v. Fiumefreddo, 626 N.E.2d 646, 650–53 (N.Y. 1993) (scrutinizing 
carefully but approving deal in which adult daughter pleaded guilty to murder in exchange for a 
light sentence for her father). See generally Bruce A. Green, “Package” Plea Bargaining and the 
Prosecutor’s Duty of Good Faith, 25 CRIM. L. BULL. 507 (1989) (scrutinizing the ethical 
problems posed by package plea bargains). 
210. Cf., e.g., State v. Danh, 516 N.W.2d 539, 542–43 (Minn. 1994) (requiring disclosure 
by prosecutors and careful colloquy by trial courts on package-deal terms of plea agreements). 
211. One could require cooling-off periods for all pleas, but because they could be 
cumbersome, it makes sense to reserve them for the highest-stakes cases where defendants may 
feel the most pressure to jump at a deal. Moreover, cooling-off periods in minor cases could force 
petty offenders who did not make bail to remain in jail longer instead of pleading guilty in 
exchange for time served. 
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final plea deal might need to be put on the table a week before trial, to allow 
time for advice and avoid pressure for last-minute deals.) Cooling-off periods 
help to make decisions more dispassionate and to reduce second-guessing of 
rash snap judgments. They are most valuable when (1) people make a decision 
infrequently and are therefore inexperienced, and (2) the decision is an 
emotional one.212 Felony guilty pleas satisfy both criteria. 
Construction of Terms. To counterbalance prosecutors’ repeat-player 
advantages, the law could also construe nonstandard terms more strictly. 
Contract law often employs the canon of construing ambiguous terms contra 
proferentem, that is, against the party who drafted them.213 Plea bargaining law 
could apply this canon more vigorously.214 Prosecutors are repeat players and 
can draft plea agreements to minimize ambiguity. If they want to draft contracts 
containing nonstandard terms, then prosecutors ought to be crystal clear or risk 
having any ambiguities construed against them. If, for example, prosecutors 
want defendants to forfeit crime-related property, they ought to spell out 
specifically what property is to be forfeited. Issues will arise on which ex ante 
precision is impossible, such as the definition of good-faith cooperation in an 
undercover investigation and subsequent testimony. There, agreements ought at 
least to set benchmarks for performance as clearly as possible. 
Prosecutorial Disclosure. In addition to rules of construction, prosecutors 
might be subject to certain disclosure obligations, even when defendants decide 
to plead guilty without plea agreements. The Second Circuit, for example, 
encourages prosecutors to send defendants letters setting forth their 
understandings of how the U.S. Sentencing Guidelines should apply to each 
defendant’s case.215 These Pimentel letters, as they are called, give defendants 
fair warnings of the sentences they are likely to receive in exchange for their 
pleas and any enhancements that arguably apply.216 Other mandatory 
disclosures could cover concurrent versus consecutive sentencing for all 
pending charges, as well as possible or mandatory parole, supervised release, 
 
212. RICHARD H. THALER & CASS R. SUNSTEIN, NUDGE: IMPROVING DECISIONS ABOUT 
HEALTH, WEALTH, AND HAPPINESS 250–51 (2008) (giving as examples cooling-off periods for 
high-pressure door-to-door sales and also mandatory waiting periods for divorces). 
213. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 206 (1981) (“In choosing among the 
reasonable meanings of a promise or agreement or a term thereof, that meaning is generally 
preferred which operates against the party who supplies the words or from whom the writing 
otherwise proceeds.”). 
214. Some courts already apply the contra proferentem canon to plea agreements. United 
States v. Gebbie, 294 F.3d 540, 552 (3d Cir. 2002) (summarizing cases). More recently, however, 
courts have been treating that canon in private litigation, and the analogous rule of lenity in 
criminal litigation, as last-resort tiebreakers and not as weighty independent considerations. 
Edward J. Imwinkelried, Forensic Science: Scientific Evidence–and Statutes, 43 CRIM. L. BULL. 
739, 753 (2007). 
215. United States v. Pimentel, 932 F.2d 1029, 1034 (2d Cir. 1991). Though the absence of 
a Pimentel letter would not necessitate reversal, the presence of one would create a safe harbor 
against claims of misunderstanding or misadvice about Guidelines calculations. 
216. See id. 
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civil commitment, and asset forfeiture. These disclosures would help to inform 
defendants’ decisions about whether (and how) to plead guilty. 
Prosecutors and courts could likewise have to clarify the consequences 
defendants face in other ways. For example, they ought to notify defendants of 
possible departures from presumptive sentences. They might also have to 
consolidate all outstanding cases for sentencing, so defendants have a 
comprehensive picture of the exposure they face. Indeed, the ABA’s Standards 
for Criminal Justice: Sentencing already require both of these steps.217 
More generally, plea bargains could take a page from the law of default 
terms. There is an extensive literature on the possibility of using information-
forcing and penalty defaults in ordinary contracts.218 These doctrines can 
induce parties to disclose information and discuss possibilities to which they 
might not otherwise have adverted. In this context, one might make default 
terms standard and somewhat prodefendant. This way, repeat-player prosecu-
tors would explicitly set forth the more proprosecution terms they were propo-
sing, prompting defendants and defense counsel to focus on and think about 
them. That approach would encourage careful written records of agreements 
instead of oral understandings that risk disputes and forgetfulness later on. 
For instance, because the parties might not consider the possibility of 
breach, defaults would prod the parties to specify what constitutes a breach and 
what remedies could serve as liquidated damages. Today, some plea agreements 
simply ask defendants to waive their rights to appeal without further 
explanation.219 Others, however, specify that defendants are waiving their rights 
to appeal any sentence below a set number except on specified grounds.220 
Courts ought to be more willing to uphold specific waiver terms, which ensure 
that waivers are knowing, but could construe vague waivers narrowly. 
Framing. Difficult issues surround the decision of which frame or 
baseline to use. Possibilities include the defendant’s current status (either 
freedom on bail or imprisonment pending trial) or the expected post-trial 
sentence. The choice of a baseline on which to anchor greatly influences 
whether defendants view bargains as gains (to be locked in) or losses (worth 
gambling to avoid). The same is true of probabilities: it matters greatly whether 
 
217. AM. BAR ASS’N, ABA STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE: SENTENCING 18-5.15, 
18-5.16 (3d ed. 1994). 
218. The literature on the topic is far too vast to catalogue here, and there is significant 
debate about whether penalty default rules exist or differ from those based on the parties’ 
hypothetical intents. The seminal article on the topic is Ian Ayres & Robert Gertner, Filling Gaps 
in Incomplete Contracts: An Economic Theory of Default Rules, 99 YALE L.J. 87 (1989). 
219. E.g., United States v. Guevara, 941 F.2d 1299, 1299 (4th Cir. 1991) (upholding an 
explicit waiver of a defendant’s “right to appeal her sentence [under 18 U.S.C. § 3742(a)] or on 
any” other grounds). 
220. E.g., COMM. ON SECOND CIRCUIT COURTS, FED. BAR COUNCIL, PROFFER, PLEA AND 
COOPERATION AGREEMENTS IN THE SECOND CIRCUIT at C-4, C-14, C-15, C-31, C-36, C-62 
(2003) (reprinting standard-form plea agreements used by the U.S. Attorney’s Offices for the 
District of Connecticut and the Northern, Southern, Eastern, and Western Districts of New York). 
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defense counsel describes a 15 percent chance of acquittal at trial or an 85 
percent chance of conviction. The choice of baselines is never neutral, so plea 
bargainers can manipulate bargains to make them seem like gains or reduced 
losses depending on whether they want them to seem attractive or not.221 It is 
not clear that there is a single baseline that best tracks defendants’ wishes in a 
world of perfect information. So perhaps the default ought to be a socially 
optimal one, framing plea bargains consistently as gains relative to trial 
outcomes, nudging defendants towards pleas. Whether to require that framing 
or merely make it a default starting point depends on how much one fears that 
lawyers manipulate frames for self-serving ends.  
Improving Defense Lawyering. Most important of all would be the advice 
of counsel. Defendants must trust their lawyers because they cannot begin to 
learn enough and their lawyers are experts. Defense lawyers may need training, 
guidance, and reminders to ensure that they advise their clients competently. 
Bar associations could help to address this concern by developing best practices 
for advising defendants on guilty pleas.222 Checklists or computer programs 
could flag typical collateral consequences of which defense lawyers must warn, 
based on each defendant’s charges, jurisdiction, immigration status, address, 
and job. They could do the same for defense lawyers’ duties to investigate, 
prepare, meet with clients, and advise. Checklists sound too obvious to be 
much of a change, but they would offer much more concrete guidance than 
current law. Strickland shied away from rules or even rules of thumb to guide 
defense lawyers and lower courts, making review difficult and prey to the 
inevitability bias.223 As Dr. Atul Gawande has argued, checklists remain an 
underused solution to the modern problem of extreme complexity. They remind 
professionals to avoid common errors by going by the book.224 These measures 
are incremental, practical starting points. One can at least hope for more radical 
reforms, such as alleviating the chronic underfunding, overwork, and agency 
costs that plague appointed defense counsel.225 
 
 
221. See Bibas, supra note 29, at 2507–19. 
222. See AM. BAR ASS’N, COLLATERAL SANCTIONS AND DISCRETIONARY 
DISQUALIFICATION OF CONVICTED PERSONS 19-2.1 (3d ed. 2004) (calling for jurisdictions to 
compile all collateral consequences); UNIFORM COLLATERAL CONSEQUENCES OF CONVICTION 
ACT § 4 (2009) (same). 
223. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 688–89, 696 (1984); Stephanos Bibas, The 
Psychology of Hindsight and After-the-Fact Review of Ineffective Assistance of Counsel, 2004 
UTAH L. REV. 1, 5–6. But see Blume & Neumann, supra note 145 (noting that, in regulating 
defense counsel’s investigation of mitigating evidence at capital sentencing, the Court has 
increasingly looked to bar guidelines). 
224. ATUL GAWANDE, THE CHECKLIST MANIFESTO: HOW TO GET THINGS RIGHT (2009). 
225. I have previously discussed these problems. A partial solution, I have suggested, is to 
concentrate criminal-defense appointments among public defenders (as opposed to appointed 
private lawyers) to maximize the benefits of repeat-player knowledge and experience. See Bibas, 
supra note 29, at 2476–86, 2534, 2539–40. 
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Perhaps counterintuitively, the relatively small-bore proposals I have just 
outlined may help lead to broader-based reforms. In objecting to Padilla’s 
disclosure requirement, Justice Scalia feared that the Court’s opinion would 
foreclose better legislative regulation of plea bargaining.226 But increased 
transparency and disclosure may have a different effect on legislatures. If full 
disclosure of overly harsh collateral consequences causes many defendants to 
balk at pleading guilty, prosecutors may press for reforms. They may urge 
legislatures either to curtail collateral consequences, or at least to make them 
waivable as part of plea bargains, to avoid gumming up the plea-bargaining as-
sembly line. Alternatively, they may press legislatures to give them even bigger 
sticks with which to threaten higher post-trial penalties and so coerce pleas. 
Now, there is a danger in analogizing plea bargains too closely to the law 
of contracts. Plea bargains are not simple bilateral deals; they should also 
respect victims’ and the public’s sense of justice. The more that prosecutors 
must do before imposing a penalty, the more they can behave strategically and 
omit terms to dictate lower outcomes. Perhaps some terms ought not be within 
prosecutors’ control to remove the possibility of their being used as plea-
bargaining chips. But if certain terms are out of prosecutors’ control, judges 
must carefully advise defendants about any mandatory terms that trump 
purported bargains to prevent surprise. 
The point here is not so much to come up with specific solutions as to 
prod more creative thinking. Plea bargains are hugely important yet complex 
legal products that are beyond the power of many defendants to navigate 
unaided. Though that market is deeply flawed by agency costs and structural 
and psychological distortions, neither complaining nor wishing will make it 
disappear.227 It is here to stay and cries out for practical reforms. Clear 
disclosures, reasonable standard terms, careful drafting and construction, and 
competent advice would improve this market. Boilerplate disclosures and 
consumer protections may not work wonders in practice, but they would be 
better than nothing. Even if these changes do not dictate substantive terms, 
they can help somewhat to make the bargaining process fairer, clearer, and 
better informed. 
B. The Contributions of Various Institutional Actors 
I have already alluded to the roles that lawyers and judges could play in 
this scheme. As noted just above, line prosecutors and judges might have 
various disclosure obligations. Rules of construction might prod prosecutors to 
spell out unclear terms. Judges would read unclear or nonstandard agreements  
 
 
226. Padilla v. Kentucky, 130 S. Ct. 1473, 1496–97 (2010) (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
227. See generally Bibas, supra note 29 (advocating practical reforms within the real world 
of guilty pleas). 
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vigorously against the drafter. Line defense counsel could use checklists and 
training in plea bargaining. 
As Part III.C suggested, the institutional picture should be more complex 
than just the two courtroom attorneys and one judge. Legislatures and rules 
advisory committees could restructure the processes of discovery and the 
substance of plea colloquies. Supervisory prosecutors could play important 
roles in promulgating office policies and standard-form plea agreements. They 
could review these materials with care. They could also ride herd on line 
prosecutors to prevent high-pressure tactics such as exploding offers and 
unconscionable threats or bluffs. Supervisory defense lawyers could regularly 
inquire about the problems faced by their subordinates and aggregate their 
feedback. As repeat players, they can tell supervisory prosecutors about 
problems with individual prosecutors or office policies that have the effect of 
leaving defendants bewildered or pressured. Supervisory defense lawyers and 
bar associations can also train new defense lawyers by giving them the 
checklists and guidance they need. 
The most important yet neglected role may lie with sentencing 
commissions. What defendants need is not another Rule 11 boilerplate litany, 
but accurate, intelligible information about the likely sentences they face after 
plea versus after trial. Commissions could be pivotal in creating the sort of 
standardized information about typical sentencing outcomes that ought to 
dominate the substance of warnings. They could consult with graphic designers 
and marketers to devise simple, intelligible ways to represent the ranges of 
average sentences for various crimes. They could also test-market various 
formats on ex-cons to see which formats most effectively counteract various 
biases and heuristics. For example, maybe graphical frequency distributions 
could offset defendants’ overoptimism, or maybe it would be better to offer 
vignettes with photos of past defendants who assumed they would do better 
than average.  
The broader point is that higher-level institutions would bring a new 
perspective to consumer protection in plea bargaining. Supervisory prosecutors, 
supervisory defense counsel, bar authorities, rules advisory committees, 
legislatures, and sentencing commissions can collect data broadly, see 
problems synoptically, and address them proactively. The aim is not to blame 
bad apples but to put systems in place to detect patterns of problems and 
prevent future ones. The Supreme Court cannot do this on its own, but one 
hopes that Padilla will spur other institutions to build on Padilla’s recognition 
of the problem. 
CONCLUSION 
The Supreme Court is finally beginning to grapple with the difficulty of 
historical change. We have superimposed a modern criminal procedure market 
upon a colonial Bill of Rights meant for jury trials. For decades, the Court 
05 Bibas.doc (Do Not Delete) 7/5/2011  8:47 PM 
2011] REGULATING THE PLEA-BARGAINING MARKET 1161 
barely regulated plea waivers. The managerial mindset emphasized the need to 
process large caseloads efficiently, and originalists cared little about 
proceedings beyond jury trials and sentences. Though Justice Scalia’s formalist 
originalism crested early in the last decade, it showed little influence on other 
Justices in Padilla. That may be because the newer Justices see the world not as 
theoretical ex-professors but as pragmatic ex-prosecutors. In Padilla, both 
Justices Alito and Sotomayor cared less about historical juries and slippery 
slopes than about practical guidance and reasonable, workable rules. That is 
now the Court’s center of gravity and the focus of debate in the middle of the 
Court. It remains to be seen, of course, how Justice Kagan will change that 
balance; she replaces Justice Stevens, whose common-law incrementalism 
prevailed in Padilla, yet lacks his private-practice experience. 
Assuming that it continues, the Court’s pragmatic incrementalism reflects 
lawyers’ and defendants’ need for practical guidance. The Court need not 
devise constitutional rules from whole cloth in a handful of unrepresentative 
cases that reach it. Instead, it can piggyback on the accumulated wisdom of the 
bench, the bar, and the academy. Academics can offer novel suggestions, and 
the bar can experiment with them. Over time, a consensus can evolve, much as 
the common law did. Rules advisory committees, and the Court in its 
rulemaking capacity, can then codify that consensus. Flexible, nonconstitu-
tional consumer-protection measures can evolve upon the Court’s constitutional 
foundation. If egregious errors nevertheless persist, the Court can eventually 
develop constitutional common law to rein in outliers. That pragmatic, 
incremental approach to constitutional change is far more promising than a 
novel judicial fiat or a completely laissez-faire approach to proven injustices. 
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